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Abstract
Despite years of intensive research, Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) systems have not yet been
adopted in practice. This is due to additional cost of BFT in terms of resources, protocol complex-
ity and performance, compared with crash fault-tolerance (CFT). This overhead of BFT comes
from the assumption of a powerful adversary that can fully control not only the Byzantine faulty
machines, but at the same time also the message delivery schedule across the entire network, ef-
fectively inducing communication asynchrony and partitioning otherwise correct machines at will.
To many practitioners, however, such strong attacks appear irrelevant.
In this paper, we introduce cross fault tolerance or XFT, a novel approach to building reli-
able and secure distributed systems and apply it to the classical state-machine replication (SMR)
problem. In short, an XFT SMR protocol provides the reliability guarantees of widely used asyn-
chronous CFT SMR protocols such as Paxos and Raft, but also tolerates Byzantine faults in
combination with network asynchrony, as long as a majority of replicas are correct and commu-
nicate synchronously. This allows the development of XFT systems at the price of CFT (already
paid for in practice), yet with strictly stronger resilience than CFT — sometimes even stronger
than BFT itself.
As a showcase for XFT, we present XPaxos, the first XFT SMR protocol, and deploy it in a
geo-replicated setting. Although it offers much stronger resilience than CFT SMR at no extra
resource cost, the performance of XPaxos matches that of the state-of-the-art CFT protocols.
1 Introduction
Tolerance to any kind of service disruption, whether caused by a simple hardware fault or by a large-
scale disaster, is key for the survival of modern distributed systems. Cloud-scale applications must
be inherently resilient, as any outage has direct implications on the business behind them [24].
Modern production systems (e.g., [13, 8]) increase the number of nines of reliability1 by employing
sophisticated distributed protocols that tolerate crash machine faults as well as network faults, such
as network partitions or asynchrony, which reflect the inability of otherwise correct machines to
communicate among each other in a timely manner. At the heart of these systems typically lies a
crash fault-tolerant (CFT) consensus-based state-machine replication (SMR) primitive [35, 10].
These systems cannot deal with non-crash (or Byzantine [29]) faults, which include not only
malicious, adversarial behavior, but also arise from errors in the hardware, stale or corrupted data
from storage systems, memory errors caused by physical effects, bugs in software, hardware faults due
to ever smaller circuits, and human mistakes that cause state corruptions and data loss. However,
such problems do occur in practice — each of these faults has a public record of taking down major
production systems and corrupting their service [14, 4].
∗Work done while being a PhD student at EURECOM.
1As an illustration, five nines reliability means that a system is up and correctly running at least 99.999% of the
time. In other words, malfunction is limited to one hour every 10 years on average.
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Despite more than 30 years of intensive research since the seminal work of Lamport, Shostak and
Pease [29], no practical answer to tolerating non-crash faults has emerged so far. In particular, asyn-
chronous Byzantine fault-tolerance (BFT), which promises to resolve this problem [9], has not lived
up to this expectation, largely because of its extra cost compared with CFT. Namely, asynchronous
(that is, “eventually synchronous” [18]) BFT SMR must use at least 3t + 1 replicas to tolerate t
non-crash faults [7] instead of only 2t + 1 replicas for CFT, as used by Paxos [27] or Raft [33], for
example.
The overhead of asynchronous BFT is due to the extraordinary power given to the adversary,
which may control both the Byzantine faulty machines and the entire network in a coordinated way.
In particular, the classical BFT adversary can partition any number of otherwise correct machines at
will. In line with observations by practitioners [25], we claim that this adversary model is actually
too strong for the phenomena observed in deployed systems. For instance, accidental non-crash faults
usually do not lead to network partitions. Even malicious non-crash faults rarely cause the whole
network to break down in wide-area networks and geo-replicated systems. The proverbial all-powerful
attacker as a common source behind those faults is a popular and powerful simplification used for the
design phase, but it has not seen equivalent proliferation in practice.
In this paper, we introduce XFT (short for cross fault tolerance), a novel approach to building
efficient resilient distributed systems that tolerate both non-crash (Byzantine) faults and network
faults (asynchrony). In short, XFT allows building resilient systems that
• do not use extra resources (replicas) compared with asynchronous CFT;
• preserve all reliability guarantees of asynchronous CFT (that is, in the absence of Byzantine
faults); and
• provide correct service (i.e., safety and liveness [2]) even when Byzantine faults do occur, as long
as a majority of the replicas are correct and can communicate with each other synchronously
(that is, when a minority of the replicas are Byzantine-faulty or partitioned because of a network
fault).
In particular, we envision XFT for wide-area or geo-replicated systems [13], as well as for any other
deployment where an adversary cannot easily coordinate enough network partitions and Byzantine-
faulty machine actions at the same time.
As a showcase for XFT, we present XPaxos, the first state-machine replication protocol in the XFT
model. XPaxos tolerates faults beyond crashes in an efficient and practical way, achieving much greater
coverage of realistic failure scenarios than the state-of-the-art CFT SMR protocols, such as Paxos or
Raft. This comes without resource overhead as XPaxos uses 2t+1 replicas. To validate the performance
of XPaxos, we deployed it in a geo-replicated setting across Amazon EC2 datacenters worldwide. In
particular, we integrated XPaxos within Apache ZooKeeper, a prominent and widely used coordination
service for cloud systems [19]. Our evaluation on EC2 shows that XPaxos performs almost as well in
terms of throughput and latency as a WAN-optimized variant of Paxos, and significantly better than
the best available BFT protocols. In our evaluation, XPaxos even outperforms the native CFT SMR
protocol built into ZooKeeper [20].
Finally, and perhaps surprisingly, we show that XFT can offer strictly stronger reliability guaran-
tees than state-of-the-art BFT, for instance under the assumption that machine faults and network
faults occur as independent and identically distributed random variables, for certain probabilities.
To this end, we calculate the number of nines of consistency (system safety) and availability (system
liveness) of resource-optimal CFT, BFT and XFT (e.g., XPaxos) protocols. Whereas XFT always pro-
vides strictly stronger consistency and availability guarantees than CFT and always strictly stronger
availability guarantees than BFT, our reliability analysis shows that, in some cases, XFT also provides
strictly stronger consistency guarantees than BFT.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the system model,
which is then followed by the definition of the XFT model in Section 3. In Section 4 and Section 5,
we present XPaxos and its evaluation in the geo-replicated context, respectively. Section 6 provides
simplified reliability analysis comparing XFT with CFT and BFT. We overview related work and
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conclude in Section 7. The full pseudocode and correctness proof of XPaxos is given in Appendix B
and C.
2 System model
Machines. We consider a message-passing distributed system containing a set Π of n = |Π| machines,
also called replicas. Additionally, there is a separate set C of client machines.
Clients and replicas may suffer from Byzantine faults: we distinguish between crash faults, where
a machine simply stops all computation and communication, and non-crash faults, where a machine
acts arbitrarily, but cannot break cryptographic primitives we use (cryptographic hashes, MACs,
message digests and digital signatures). A machine that is not faulty is called correct. We say a
machine is benign if the machine is correct or crash-faulty. We further denote the number of replica
faults at a given moment s by
• tc(s): the number of crash-faulty replicas, and
• tnc(s): the number of non-crash-faulty replicas.
Network. Each pair of replicas is connected with reliable point-to-point bi-directional communication
channels. In addition, each client can communicate with any replica.
The system can be asynchronous in the sense that machines may not be able to exchange messages
and obtain responses to their requests in time. In other words, network faults are possible; we define
a network fault as the inability of some correct replicas to communicate with each other in a timely
manner, that is, when a message exchanged between two correct replicas cannot be delivered and
processed within delay ∆, known to all replicas. Note that ∆ is a deployment specific parameter: we
discuss practical choices for ∆ in the context of our geo-replicated setting in Section 5. Finally, we
assume an eventually synchronous system in which, eventually, network faults do not occur [18].
Note that we model an excessive processing delay as a network problem and not as an issue related
to a machine fault. This choice is made consciously, rooted in the experience that for the general class
of protocols considered in this work, a long local processing time is never an issue on correct machines
compared with network delays.
To help quantify the number of network faults, we first give the definition of partitioned replica.
Definition 1 (Partitioned replica). Replica p is partitioned if p is not in the largest subset of replicas,
in which every pair of replicas can communicate among each other within delay ∆.
If there is more than one subset with the maximum size, only one of them is recognized as the
largest subset. For example in Figure 1, the number of partitioned replicas is 3, counting either the
group of p1, p4 and p5 or that of p2, p3 and p5. The number of partitioned replicas can be as much as
n − 1, which means that no two replicas can communicate with each other within delay ∆. We say
replica p is synchronous if p is not partitioned. We now quantify network faults at a given moment s
as
• tp(s): the number of correct, but partitioned replicas.
Problem. In this paper, we focus on the deterministic state-machine replication problem (SMR)
[35]. In short, in SMR clients invoke requests, which are then committed by replicas. SMR ensures
• safety, or consistency, by (a) enforcing total order across committed client’s requests across all
correct replicas; and by (b) enforcing validity, i.e., that a correct replica commits a request only
if it was previously invoked by a client;
• liveness, or availability, by eventually committing a request by a correct client at all correct
replicas and returning an application-level reply to the client.
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Figure 1: An illustration of partitioned replicas: {p1, p4, p5} or {p2, p3, p5} are partitioned based on
Definition 1.
3 The XFT model
This section introduces the XFT model and relates it to the established crash-fault tolerance (CFT)
and Byzantine-fault tolerance (BFT) models.
3.1 XFT in a nutshell
Maximum number of each type of replica faults
non-crash faults crash faults partitioned replicas
Asynchronous CFT (e.g., Paxos [28])
consistency 0 n n− 1
availability 0 bn−12 c (combined)
Asynchronous BFT (e.g., PBFT [9])
consistency bn−13 c n n− 1
availability bn−13 c (combined)
(Authenticated) Synchronous BFT (e.g., [29])
consistency n− 1 n 0
availability n− 1 (combined) 0
XFT (e.g., XPaxos)
consistency
0 n n− 1
bn−12 c (combined)
availability bn−12 c (combined)
Table 1: The maximum numbers of each type of fault tolerated by representative SMR protocols.
Note that XFT provides consistency in two modes, depending on the occurrence of non-crash faults.
Classical CFT and BFT explicitly model machine faults only. These are then combined with an
orthogonal network fault model, either the synchronous model (where network faults in our sense
are ruled out), or the asynchronous model (which includes any number of network faults). Hence,
previous work can be classified into four categories: synchronous CFT [16, 35], asynchronous CFT
[35, 27, 32], synchronous BFT [29, 17, 6], and asynchronous BFT [9, 3].
XFT, in contrast, redefines the boundaries between machine and network fault dimensions: XFT
allows the design of reliable protocols that tolerate crash machine faults regardless of the number of
network faults and that, at the same time, tolerate non-crash machine faults when the number of
machines that are either faulty or partitioned is within a threshold.
To formalize XFT, we first define anarchy, a very severe system condition with actual non-crash
machine (replica) faults and plenty of faults of different kinds, as follows:
Definition 2 (Anarchy). The system is in anarchy at a given moment s iff tnc(s) > 0 and tc(s) +
tnc(s) + tp(s) > t.
Here, t is the threshold of replica faults, such that t ≤ bn−12 c. In other words, in anarchy, some
replica is non-crash-faulty, and there is no correct and synchronous majority of replicas. Armed with
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the definition of anarchy, we can define XFT protocols for an arbitrary distributed computing problem
in function of its safety property [2].
Definition 3 (XFT protocol). Protocol P is an XFT protocol if P satisfies safety in all executions
in which the system is never in anarchy.
Liveness of an XFT protocol will typically depend on a problem and implementation. For instance,
for deterministic SMR we consider in this paper, our XPaxos protocol eventually satisfies liveness,
provided a majority of replicas is correct and synchronous. This can be shown optimal.
3.2 XFT vs. CFT/BFT
Table 1 illustrates differences between XFT and CFT/BFT in terms of their consistency and avail-
ability guarantees for SMR.
State-of-the-art asynchronous CFT protocols [28, 33] guarantee consistency despite any number
of crash-faulty replicas and any number of partitioned replicas. They also guarantee availability
whenever a majority of replicas (t ≤ bn−12 c) are correct and synchronous. As soon as a single machine
is non-crash-faulty, CFT protocols guarantee neither consistency nor availability.
Optimal asynchronous BFT protocols [9, 22, 3] guarantee consistency despite any number of crash-
faulty or partitioned replicas, with at most t = bn−13 c non-crash-faulty replicas. They also guarantee
availability with up to bn−13 c combined faults, i.e., whenever more than two-thirds of replicas are
correct and not partitioned. Note that BFT availability might be weaker than that of CFT in the
absence of non-crash faults — unlike CFT, BFT does not guarantee availability when the sum of
crash-faulty and partitioned replicas is in the range [n/3, n/2).
Synchronous BFT protocols (e.g., [29]) do not consider the existence of correct, but partitioned
replicas. This makes for a very strong assumption — and helps synchronous BFT protocols that use
digital signatures for message authentication (so called authenticated protocols) to tolerate up to n−1
non-crash-faulty replicas.
In contrast, XFT protocols with optimal resilience, such as our XPaxos, guarantee consistency in
two modes: (i) without non-crash faults, despite any number of crash-faulty and partitioned replicas
(i.e., just like CFT), and (ii) with non-crash faults, whenever a majority of replicas are correct and
not partitioned, i.e., provided the sum of all kinds of faults (machine or network faults) does not
exceed bn−12 c. Similarly, it also guarantees availability whenever a majority of replicas are correct
and not partitioned.
It may be tempting to view XFT as some sort of a combination of the asynchronous CFT and
synchronous BFT models. However, this is misleading, as even with actual non-crash faults, XFT
is incomparable to authenticated synchronous BFT. Specifically, authenticated synchronous BFT
protocols, such as the seminal Byzantine Generals protocol [29], may violate consistency with a single
partitioned replica. For instance, with n = 5 replicas and an execution in which three replicas are
correct and synchronous, one replica is correct but partitioned and one replica is non-crash-faulty, the
XFT model mandates that the consistency be preserved, whereas the Byzantine Generals protocol
may violate consistency.2
Furthermore, from Table 1, it is evident that XFT offers strictly stronger guarantees than asyn-
chronous CFT, for both availability and consistency. XFT also offers strictly stronger availability
guarantees than asynchronous BFT. Finally, the consistency guarantees of XFT are incomparable to
those of asynchronous BFT. On the one hand, outside anarchy, XFT is consistent with the number of
non-crash faults in the range [n/3, n/2), whereas asynchronous BFT is not. On the other hand, unlike
XFT, asynchronous BFT is consistent in anarchy provided the number of non-crash faults is less than
n/3. We discuss these points further in Section 6, where we also quantify the reliability comparison
between XFT and asynchronous CFT/BFT assuming the special case of independent faults.
2XFT is not stronger than authenticated synchronous BFT either, as the latter tolerates more machine faults in the
complete absence of network faults.
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3.3 Where to use XFT?
The intuition behind XFT starts from the assumption that “extremely bad” system conditions, such
as anarchy, are very rare, and that providing consistency guarantees in anarchy might not be worth
paying the asynchronous BFT premium.
In practice, this assumption is plausible in many deployments. We envision XFT for use cases in
which an adversary cannot easily coordinate enough network partitions and non-crash-faulty machine
actions at the same time. Some interesting candidate use cases include:
• Tolerating “accidental” non-crash faults. In systems which are not susceptible to malicious
behavior and deliberate attacks, XFT can be used to protect against “accidental“ non-crash
faults, which can be assumed to be largely independent of network faults. In such cases, XFT
could be used to harden CFT systems without considerable overhead of BFT.
• Wide-area networks and geo-replicated systems. XFT may reveal useful even in cases where the
system is susceptible to malicious non-crash faults, as long as it may be difficult or expensive
for an adversary to coordinate an attack to compromise Byzantine machines and partition
sufficiently many replicas at the same time. Particularly interesting for XFT are WAN and
geo-replicated systems which often enjoy redundant communication paths and typically have a
smaller surface for network-level DoS attacks (e.g., no multicast storms and flooding).
• Blockchain. A special case of geo-replicated systems, interesting to XFT, are blockchain systems.
In a typical blockchain system, such as Bitcoin [31], participants may be financially motivated
to act maliciously, yet may lack the means and capabilities to compromise the communication
among (a large number of) correct participants. In this context, XFT is particularly interesting
for so-called permissioned blockchains, which are based on state-machine replication rather than
on Bitcoin-style proof-of-work [39].
4 XPaxos Protocol
4.1 XPaxos overview
XPaxos is a novel state-machine replication (SMR) protocol designed specifically in the XFT model.
XPaxos specifically targets good performance in geo-replicated settings, which are characterized by the
network being the bottleneck, with high link latency and relatively low, heterogeneous link bandwidth.
In a nutshell, XPaxos consists of three main components:
• A common-case protocol, which replicates and totally orders requests across replicas. This
has, roughly speaking, the message pattern and complexity of communication among replicas of
state-of-the-art CFT protocols (e.g., Phase 2 of Paxos), hardened by the use of digital signatures.
• A novel view-change protocol, in which the information is transferred from one view (system
configuration) to another in a decentralized, leaderless fashion.
• A fault detection (FD) mechanism, which can help detect, outside anarchy, non-crash faults
that would leave the system in an inconsistent state in anarchy. The goal of the FD mechanism
is to minimize the impact of long-lived non-crash faults (in particular “data loss” faults) in the
system and to help detect them before they coincide with a sufficient number of crash faults
and network faults to push the system into anarchy.
XPaxos is orchestrated in a sequence of views [9]. The central idea in XPaxos is that, during
common-case operation in a given view, XPaxos synchronously replicates clients’ requests to only
t + 1 replicas, which are the members of a synchronous group (out of n = 2t + 1 replicas in total).
Each view number i uniquely determines the synchronous group, sgi, using a mapping known to all
replicas. Every synchronous group consists of one primary and t followers, which are jointly called
active replicas. The remaining t replicas in a given view are called passive replicas; optionally, passive
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Figure 2: XPaxos common-case message patterns (a) for the general case when t ≥ 2 and (b) for the
special case of t = 1. The synchronous groups are (s0, s1, s2) and (s0, s1), respectively.
replicas learn the order from the active replicas using the lazy replication approach [26]. A view is
not changed unless there is a machine or network fault within the synchronous group.
In the common case (Section 4.2), the clients send digitally signed requests to the primary, which
are then replicated across t + 1 active replicas. These t + 1 replicas digitally sign and locally log
the proofs for all replicated requests to their commit logs. Commit logs then serve as the basis for
maintaining consistency in view changes.
The view change of XPaxos (Section 4.3) reconfigures the entire synchronous group, not only the
leader. All t+ 1 active replicas of the new synchronous group sgi+1 try to transfer the state from the
preceding views to view i+ 1. This decentralized approach to view change stands in sharp contrast to
the classical reconfiguration/view-change in CFT and BFT protocols (e.g., [27, 9]), in which only a
single replica (the primary) leads the view change and transfers the state from previous views. This
difference is crucial to maintaining consistency (i.e., total order) across XPaxos views in the presence
of non-crash faults (but in the absence of full anarchy). This novel and decentralized view-change
scheme of XPaxos guarantees that even in the presence of non-crash faults, but outside anarchy, at
least one correct replica from the new synchronous group sgi+1 will be able to transfer the correct
state from previous views, as it will be able to contact some correct replica from any old synchronous
group.
Finally, the main idea behind the FD scheme of XPaxos is the following. In view change, a
non-crash-faulty replica (of an old synchronous group) might not transfer its latest state to a correct
replica in the new synchronous group. This “data loss” fault is dangerous, as it may violate consistency
when the system is in anarchy. However, such a fault can be detected using digital signatures from
the commit log of some correct replicas (from an old synchronous group), provided that these correct
replicas can communicate synchronously with correct replicas from the new synchronous group. In a
sense, with XPaxos FD, a critical non-crash machine fault must occur for the first time together with
sufficiently many crash or partitioned machines (i.e., in anarchy) to violate consistency.
In the following, we explain the core of XPaxos for the common case (Section 4.2), view-change
(Section 4.3) and fault detection (Section 4.4) components. We discuss XPaxos optimizations in
Section 4.5 and give XPaxos correctness arguments in Section 4.6. An example of XPaxos execution
is given in Appendix A. The complete pseudocode and correctness proof are included in Appendix B
and C.
4.2 Common case
Figure 2 shows the common-case message patterns of XPaxos for the general case (t ≥ 2) and for the
special case t = 1. XPaxos is specifically optimized for the case where t = 1, as in this case, there are
only two active replicas in each view and the protocol is very efficient. The special case t = 1 is also
highly relevant in practice (see e.g., Spanner [13]). In the following, we first explain XPaxos in the
general case, and then focus on the t = 1 special case.
Notation. We denote the digest of a message m by D(m), whereas 〈m〉σp denotes a message that
contains both D(m) signed by the private key of machine p and m. For signature verification, we
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assume that all machines have public keys of all other processes.
4.2.1 General case (t ≥ 2)
The common-case message pattern of XPaxos is shown in Figure 2a. More specifically, upon receiving
a signed request req = 〈replicate, op, tsc, c〉σc from client c (where op is the client’s operation and
tsc is the client’s timestamp), the primary (say s0) (1) increments sequence number sn and assigns
sn to req, (2) signs a message prep = 〈prepare, D(req), sn, i〉σs0 and logs 〈req, prep〉 into its prepare
log PrepareLog0[sn] (we say s0 prepares req), and (3) forwards 〈req, prep〉 to all other active replicas
(i.e, the t followers).
Each follower sj (1 ≤ j ≤ t) verifies the primary’s and client’s signatures, checks whether its local
sequence number equals sn − 1, and logs 〈req, prep〉 into its prepare log PrepareLogj [sn]. Then, sj
updates its local sequence number to sn, signs the digest of the request req, the sequence number sn
and the view number i, and sends 〈commit, D(req), sn, i〉σsj to all active replicas.
Upon receiving t signed commit messages — one from each follower — such that a matching entry
is in the prepare log, an active replica sk (0 ≤ k ≤ t) logs prep and the t signed commit messages into
its commit log CommitLogsk [sn]. We say sk commits req when this occurs. Finally, sk executes req
and sends the authenticated reply to the client (followers may only send the digest of the reply). The
client commits the request when it receives matching reply messages from all t + 1 active replicas.
A client that times out without committing the requests broadcasts the request to all active
replicas. Active replicas then forward such a request to the primary and trigger a retransmission
timer, within which a correct active replica expects the client’s request to be committed.
4.2.2 Tolerating a single fault (t = 1).
When t = 1, the XPaxos common case simplifies to involving only 2 messages between 2 active replicas
(see Figure 2b).
Upon receiving a signed request req = 〈replicate, op, tsc, c〉σc from client c, the primary (s0)
increments the sequence number sn, signs sn along the digest of req and view number i in message
m0 = 〈commit, D(req), sn, i〉σs0 , stores 〈req,m0〉 into its prepare log (PrepareLogs0 [sn] = 〈req,m0〉),
and sends the message 〈req,m0〉 to the follower s1.
On receiving 〈req,m0〉, the follower s1 verifies the client’s and primary’s signatures, and checks
whether its local sequence number equals sn−1. If so, the follower updates its local sequence number
to sn, executes the request producing reply R(req), and signs message m1; m1 is similar to m0, but
also includes the client’s timestamp and the digest of the reply: m1 = 〈commit, 〈D(req), sn, i, req.tsc,
D(R(req))〉σs1 . The follower then saves the tuple 〈req,m0,m1〉 to its commit log (CommitLogs1 [sn] =〈req,m0,m1〉) and sends m1 to the primary.
The primary, on receiving a valid commit message from the follower (with a matching entry in its
prepare log), executes the request, compares the reply R(req) with the follower’s digest contained in
m1, and stores 〈req,m0,m1〉 in its commit log. Finally, it returns an authenticated reply containing
m1 to c, which commits the request if all digests and the follower’s signature match.
4.3 View change
Intuition. The ordered requests in commit logs of correct replicas are the key to enforcing consistency
(total order) in XPaxos. To illustrate an XPaxos view change, consider synchronous groups sgi and
sgi+1 of views i and i + 1, respectively, each containing t + 1 replicas. Note that proofs of requests
committed in sgi might have been logged by only one correct replica in sgi. Nevertheless, the XPaxos
view change must ensure that (outside anarchy) these proofs are transferred to the new view i + 1.
To this end, we had to depart from traditional view change techniques [9, 22, 12] where the entire
view-change is led by a single replica, usually the primary of the new view. Instead, in XPaxos
view change, every active replica in sgi+1 retrieves information about requests committed in preceding
views. Intuitively, with correct majority of correct and synchronous replicas, at least one correct and
synchronous replica from sgi+1 will contact (at least one) correct and synchronous replica from sgi
and transfer the latest correct commit log to the new view i + 1.
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Synchronous Groups
(i ∈ N0)
sgi sgi+1 sgi+2
Active replicas
Primary s0 s0 s1
Follower s1 s2 s2
Passive replica s2 s1 s0
Table 2: Synchronous group combinations (t = 1).
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3 VC-FINAL
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1 2
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4 with signature
Figure 3: Illustration of XPaxos view change: the synchronous group is changed from (s0,s1) to (s0,s2).
In the following, we first describe how we choose active replicas for each view. Then, we explain
how view changes are initiated, and, finally, how view changes are performed.
4.3.1 Choosing active replicas
To choose active replicas for view i, we may enumerate all sets containing t + 1 replicas (i.e.,
(
2t+1
t+1
)
sets) which then alternate as synchronous groups across views in a round-robin fashion. In addition,
each synchronous group uniquely determines the primary. We assume that the mapping from view
numbers to synchronous groups is known to all replicas (see e.g., Table 2).
The above simple scheme works well for small number of replicas (e.g., t = 1 and t = 2). For
a large number of replicas, the combinatorial number of synchronous groups may be inefficient. To
this end, XPaxos can be modified to rotate only the leader, which may then resort to deterministic
verifiable pseudorandom selection of the set of f followers in each view. The exact details of such a
scheme would, however, exceed the scope of this paper.
4.3.2 View-change initiation
If a synchronous group in view i (denoted by sgi) does not make progress, XPaxos performs a view
change. Only an active replica of sgi may initiate a view change. An active replica sj ∈ sgi initiates
a view change if (i) sj receives a message from another active replica that does not conform to the
protocol (e.g., an invalid signature), (ii) the retransmission timer at sj expires, (iii) sj does not
complete a view change to view i in a timely manner, or (iv) sj receives a valid suspect message
for view i from another replica in sgi. Upon a view-change initiation, sj stops participating in the
current view and sends 〈suspect, i, sj〉σsj to all other replicas.
4.3.3 Performing the view change
Upon receiving a suspect message from an active replica in view i (see the message pattern in
Figure 3), replica sj stops processing messages of view i and sends m = 〈view-change, i + 1, sj ,
CommitLogsj 〉σsj to the t+ 1 active replicas of sgi+1. A view-change message contains the commit
log CommitLogsj of sj . Commit logs might be empty (e.g., if sj was passive).
Note that XPaxos requires all active replicas in the new view to collect the most recent state and
its proof (i.e., view-change messages), rather than only the new primary. Otherwise, a faulty new
primary could, even outside anarchy, purposely omit view-change messages that contain the most
recent state. Active replica sj in view i+ 1 waits for at least n− t view-change messages from all,
but also waits for 2∆ time, trying to collect as many messages as possible.
Upon completion of the above protocol, each active replica sj ∈ sgi+1 inserts all view-change
messages it has received into set V CSeti+1sj . Then sj sends 〈vc-final, i+1, sj , V CSeti+1sj 〉σsj to every
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active replica in view i + 1. This serves to exchange the received view-change messages among
active replicas.
Every active replica sj ∈ sgi+1 must receive vc-final messages from all active replicas in sgi+1,
after which sj extends the value V CSet
i+1
sj by combining V CSet
i+1∗ sets piggybacked in vc-final
messages. Then, for each sequence number sn, an active replica selects the commit log with the
highest view number in all view-change messages, to confirm the committed request at sn.
Afterwards, to prepare and commit the selected requests in view i+1, the new primary psi+1 sends
〈new-view, i + 1, P repareLog〉σpsi+1 to every active replica in sgi+1, where the array PrepareLog
contains the prepare logs generated in view i+1 for each selected request. Upon receiving a new-view
message, every active replica sj ∈ sgi+1 processes the prepare logs in PrepareLog as described in the
common case (see Section 4.2).
Finally, every active replica sj ∈ sgi+1 makes sure that all selected requests in PrepareLog are
committed in view i + 1. When this condition is satisfied, XPaxos can start processing new requests.
4.4 Fault detection
XPaxos does not guarantee consistency in anarchy. Hence, non-crash faults could violate XPaxos
consistency in the long run, if they persist long enough to eventually coincide with enough crash or
network faults. To cope with long-lived faults, we propose (an otherwise optional) Fault Detection
(FD) mechanism for XPaxos.
Roughly speaking, FD guarantees the following property: if a machine p suffers a non-crash fault
outside anarchy in a way that would cause inconsistency in anarchy, then XPaxos FD detects p as
faulty (outside anarchy). In other words, any potentially fatal fault that occurs outside anarchy would
be detected by XPaxos FD.
Here, we sketch how FD works in the case t = 1 (see Section B.4 for details), focusing on detecting
a specific non-crash fault that may render XPaxos inconsistent in anarchy — a data loss fault by which
a non-crash-faulty replica loses some of its commit log prior to a view change. Intuitively, data loss
faults are dangerous as they cannot be prevented by the straightforward use of digital signatures.
Our FD mechanism entails modifying the XPaxos view change as follows: in addition to exchanging
their commit logs, replicas also exchange their prepare logs. Notice that in the case t = 1 only the
primary maintains a prepare log (see Section 4.2). In the new view, the primary prepares and the
follower commits all requests contained in transferred commit and prepare logs.
With the above modification, to violate consistency, a faulty primary (of preceding view i) would
need to exhibit a data loss fault in both its commit log and its prepare log. However, such a data
loss fault in the primary’s prepare log would be detected, outside anarchy, because (i) the (correct)
follower of view i would reply in the view change and (ii) an entry in the primary’s prepare log causally
precedes the respective entry in the follower’s commit log. By simply verifying the signatures in the
follower’s commit log, the fault of a primary is detected. Conversely, a data loss fault in the commit
log of the follower of view i is detected outside anarchy by verifying the signatures in the commit log
of the primary of view i.
4.5 XPaxos optimizations
Although the common-case and view-change protocols described above are sufficient to guarantee
correctness, we applied several standard performance optimizations to XPaxos. These include check-
pointing and lazy replication [26] to passive replicas (to help shorten the state transfer during view
change) as well as batching and pipelining (to improve the throughput).
4.5.1 Checkpointing
Upon active replica sj ∈ sgi commits and executes the request with sequence number sn = k×CHK
(refer to message pattern in Fig. 4) , sj sends 〈prechk, sn, i,D(stsnsj ), sj〉µsj ,sk to every active replica
sk, where D(st
sn
sj ) is the digest of the state after executing the request at sn. Upon receiving t + 1
matching prechk messages, each active replica sj generates the checkpoint proof message m and
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sends it to every active replica (m = 〈chkpt, sn, i, D(stsnsj ), sj〉σsj ). Upon receiving t + 1 matching
chkpt messages, each active replica sj checkpoints the state and discards previous prepare logs and
commit logs.
Besides, each active replica propagates checkpoint proofs to all passive replicas by 〈lazychk, chkProof〉,
where chkProof contains t + 1 chkpt messages.
s
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s
1 
s
2 
PRECHK 1 
CHKPT 2 
3 LAZYCHK 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
3 
with MAC 
with signature 
Figure 4: XPaxos checkpointing message pattern : synchronous group is (s0,s1).
4.5.2 Lazy replication
To speed up the state transfer in view change, the followers in synchronous group lazily propagate
the commit log to every passive replica. With lazy replication, the new active replica, which might
be the passive replica in preceding view, could only retrieve the missing state from others.
More specifically, (refer to message pattern in Fig. 5) in case t = 1, upon committing request req,
the follower sends commit log of req to the passive replica. In case t ≥ 2, either each of t followers
sends commit log of req to one passive replica, or each follower sends a fraction of 1t commit logs to
every passive replica. Only in case the bandwidth between followers and passive replicas are saturated,
the primary is involved in lazy replication. Each passive replica commits and executes requests based
on orders defined by commit logs.
Although non-crash faulty replicas can interfere with the lazy replication scheme, this would not
impact the correctness of the protocol, but only slow down the view-change.
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Figure 5: XPaxos common-case message patterns with lazy replication for t = 1 and t ≥ 2 (here t = 2).
Synchronous group illustrated are (s0,s1) (when t = 1) and (s0,s1,s2) (when t = 2), respectively.
Batching and pipelining. To improve the throughput of cryptographic operations, the primary
batches several requests when preparing. The primary waits for B requests, then signs the batched
request and sends it to every follower. If primary receives less than B requests within a time limit,
the primary batches all requests it has received.
4.6 Correctness arguments
Consistency (Total Order). XPaxos enforces the following invariant, which is key to total order.
Lemma 1. Outside anarchy, if a benign client c commits a request req with sequence number sn in
view i, and a benign replica sk commits the request req
′ with sn in view i′ > i, then req = req′.
A benign client c commits request req with sequence number sn in view i only after c has received
matching replies from t+ 1 active replicas in sgi. This implies that every benign replica in sgi stores
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req into its commit log under sequence number sn. In the following, we focus on the special case
where: i′ = i + 1. This serves as the base step for the proof of Lemma 1 by induction across views
which we give in Section C.
Recall that, in view i′ = i+1, all (benign) replicas from sgi+1 wait for n− t = t+1 view-change
messages containing commit logs transferred from other replicas, as well as for the timer set to 2∆
to expire. Then, replicas in sgi+1 exchange this information within vc-final messages. Note that,
outside anarchy, there exists at least one correct and synchronous replica in sgi+1, say sj . Hence, a
benign replica sk that commits req
′ in view i+ 1 under sequence number sn must have had received
vc-final from sj . In turn, sj waited for t+ 1 view-change messages (and timer 2∆), so it received
a view-change message from some correct and synchronous replica sx ∈ sgi (such a replica exists in
sgi as at most t replicas in sgi are non-crash-faulty or partitioned). As sx stored req under sn in its
commit log in view i, it forwards this information to sj in a view-change message, and sj forwards
this information to sk within a vc-final. Hence req = req
′ follows.
Availability. XPaxos availability is guaranteed if the synchronous group contains only correct and
synchronous replicas. With eventual synchrony, we can assume that, eventually, there will be no
network faults. In addition, with all combinations of t + 1 replicas rotating in the role of active
replicas, XPaxos guarantees that, eventually, view change in XPaxos will complete with t + 1 correct
and synchronous active replicas.
5 Performance Evaluation
US West 1 (CA) Europe (EU) Tokyo (JP) Sydney (AU) Sao Paolo (BR)
US East (VA) 88 /1097 /82190 /166390 92 /1112 /85649 /169749 179 /1226 /81177 /165277 268 /1372 /95074 /179174 146 /1214 /85434 /169534
US West 1 (CA) 174 /1184 /1974 /15467 120 /1133 /1180 /6210 186 /1209 /6354 /51646 207 /1252 /90980 /169080
Europe (EU) 287 /1310 /1397 /4798 342 /1375 /3154 /11052 233 /1257 /1382 /9188
Tokyo (JP) 137 /1149 /1414 /5228 394 /2496 /11399 /94775
Sydney (AU) 392 /1496 /2134 /10983
Table 3: Round-trip latency of TCP ping (hping3 ) across Amazon EC2 datacenters, collected during
three months. The latencies are given in milliseconds, in the format: average / 99.99% / 99.999% /
maximum.
In this section, we evaluate the performance of XPaxos and compare it to that of Zyzzyva [22],
PBFT [9] and a WAN-optimized version of Paxos [27], using the Amazon EC2 worldwide cloud
platform. We chose geo-replicated, WAN settings as we believe that these are a better fit for protocols
that tolerate Byzantine faults, including XFT and BFT. Indeed, in WAN settings (i) there is no single
point of failure such as a switch interconnecting machines, (ii) there are no correlated failures due to,
e.g., a power-outage, a storm, or other natural disasters, and (iii) it is difficult for the adversary to
flood the network, correlating network and non-crash faults (the last point is relevant for XFT).
In the remainder of this section, we first present the experimental setup (Section 5.1), and then
evaluate the performance (throughput, latency and CPU cost) in the fault-free scenario (Section 5.2
and Section 5.3) as well as under faults (Section 5.4). Finally, we perform a performance comparison
using a real application, the ZooKeeper coordination service [19] (Section 5.5), by comparing native
ZooKeeper to ZooKeeper variants that use the four replication protocols mentioned above.
5.1 Experimental setup
5.1.1 Synchrony and XPaxos
In a practical deployment of XPaxos, a critical parameter is the value of timeout ∆, i.e., the upper
bound on the communication delay between any two correct machines. If the round-trip time (RTT)
between two correct machines takes more than 2∆, we declare a network fault (see Section 2). Notably,
∆ is vital to the XPaxos view-change (Section 4.3).
To understand the value of ∆ in our geo-replicated context, we ran a 3-month experiment during
which we continuously measured the round-trip latency across six Amazon EC2 datacenters worldwide
using TCP ping (hping3). We used the least expensive EC2 micro instances, which arguably have the
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highest probability of experiencing variable latency due to virtualization. Each instance was pinging
all other instances every 100 ms. The results of this experiment are summarized in Table 3. While
we detected network faults lasting up to 3 min, our experiment showed that the round-trip latency
between any two datacenters was less than 2.5 sec 99.99% of the time. Therefore, we adopted the
value of ∆ = 2.5/2 = 1.25 sec.
5.1.2 Protocols under test
We compare XPaxos with three protocols whose common-case message patterns when t = 1 are shown
in Figure 6. The first two are BFT protocols, namely (a speculative variant of) PBFT [9] and Zyzzyva
[22], and require 3t + 1 replicas to tolerate t faults. We chose PBFT because it is possible to derive
a speculative variant of the protocol that relies on a 2-phase common-case commit protocol across
only 2t + 1 replicas (Figure 6a; see also [9]). In this PBFT variant, the remaining t replicas are not
involved in the common case, which is more efficient in a geo-replicated settings. We chose Zyzzyva
because it is the fastest BFT protocol that involves all replicas in the common case (Figure 6b). The
third protocol we compare against is a very efficient WAN-optimized variant of crash-tolerant Paxos
inspired by [5, 23, 13]. We have chosen the variant of Paxos that exhibits the fastest write pattern
(Figure 6c). This variant requires 2t+ 1 replicas to tolerate t faults, but involves t+ 1 replicas in the
common case, i.e., just like XPaxos.
To provide a fair comparison, all protocols rely on the same Java code base and use batching,
with the batch size set to 20. We rely on HMAC-SHA1 to compute MACs and RSA1024 to sign
and verify signatures computed using the Crypto++ [1] library that we interface with the various
protocols using JNI.
primary 
s
1 
s
2 
s
3 
client 
(a) PBFT
primary 
s
1 
s
2 
s
3 
client 
(b) Zyzzyva
leader 
s
1 
s
2 
client 
(c) Paxos
Figure 6: Communication patterns of the three protocols under test (t = 1).
5.1.3 Experimental testbed and benchmarks
We run the experiments on the Amazon EC2 platform which comprises widely distributed datacenters,
interconnected by the Internet. Communications between datacenters have a low bandwidth and a
high latency. We run the experiments on mid-range virtual machines that contain 8 vCPUs, 15
GB of memory, 2 x 80 GB SSD storage, and run Ubuntu Server 14.04 LTS (PV) with the Linux
3.13.0-24-generic x86 64 kernel.
In the case t = 1, Table 4 gives the deployment of the different replicas at different datacenters, for
each protocol analyzed. Clients are always located in the same datacenter as the (initial) primary to
better emulate what is done in modern geo-replicated systems where clients are served by the closest
datacenter [36, 13].3
To stress the protocols, we run a microbenchmark that is similar to the one used in [9, 22]. In
this microbenchmark, each server replicates a null service (this means that there is no execution of
requests). Moreover, clients issue requests in closed-loop: a client waits for a reply to its current
request before issuing a new request. The benchmark allows both the request size and the reply size
3In practice, modern geo-replicated system, like Spanner [13], use hundreds of CFT SMR instances across different
partitions to accommodate geo-distributed clients.
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to be varied. For space limitations, we only report results for two request sizes (1kB, 4kB) and one
reply size (0kB). We refer to these microbenchmarks as 1/0 and 4/0 benchmarks, respectively.
5.2 Fault-free performance
We first compare the performance of protocols when t = 1 in replica configurations as shown in
Table 4, using the 1/0 and 4/0 microbenchmarks. The results are shown in Figures 7a and 7b. In
each graph, the X-axis shows the throughput (in kops/sec), and Y-axis the latency (in ms).
PBFT Zyzzyva Paxos XPaxos EC2 Region
Primary Primary Primary Primary US West (CA)
Active
Active
Active Follower US East (VA)
Passive Passive Tokyo (JP)
Passive - - Europe (EU)
Table 4: Configurations of replicas. Shaded replicas are not used in the common case.
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Figure 7: Fault-free performance
As we can see, in both benchmarks, XPaxos achieves a significantly better performance than PBFT
and Zyzzyva. This is because, in a worldwide cloud environment, the network is the bottleneck and the
message patterns of BFT protocols, namely PBFT and Zyzzyva, tend to be expensive. Compared with
PBFT, the simpler message pattern of XPaxos allows better throughput. Compared with Zyzzyva,
XPaxos puts less stress on the leader and replicates requests in the common case across 3 times
fewer replicas than Zyzzyva (i.e., across t followers vs. across all other 3t replicas). Moreover, the
performance of XPaxos is very close to that of Paxos. Both Paxos and XPaxos implement a round-trip
across two replicas when t = 1, which renders them very efficient.
Next, to assess the fault scalability of XPaxos, we ran the 1/0 micro-benchmark in configurations
that tolerate two faults (t = 2). We use the following EC2 datacenters for this experiment: CA (Cal-
ifornia), OR (Oregon), VA (Virginia), JP (Tokyo), EU (Ireland), AU (Sydney) and SG (Singapore).
We place Paxos and XPaxos active replicas in the first t+ 1 datacenters, and their passive replicas in
the next t datacenters. PBFT uses the first 2t + 1 datacenters for active replicas and the last t for
passive replicas. Finally, Zyzzyva uses all replicas as active replicas.
We observe that XPaxos again clearly outperforms PBFT and Zyzzyva and achieves a performance
very close to that of Paxos. Moreover, unlike PBFT and Zyzzyva, Paxos and XPaxos only suffer a
moderate performance decrease with respect to the t = 1 case.
5.3 CPU cost
To assess the cost of using signatures in XPaxos, we extracted the CPU usage during the experiments
presented in Section 5.2 with 1/0 and 4/0 micro-benchmarks when t = 1. During experiments, we
periodically sampled CPU usage at the most loaded node (the primary in every protocol) with the
top Linux monitoring tool. The results are depicted in Figure 8 for both the 1/0 and 4/0 micro-
benchmarks. The X-axis represents the peak throughput (in kops/s), whereas the Y-axis represents
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Figure 8: CPU usage when running the 1/0 and 4/0 micro-benchmarks.
the CPU usage (in %). Not surprisingly, we observe that the CPU usage of all protocols is higher
with the 1/0 benchmark than with the 4/0 benchmark. This comes from the fact that in the former
case, there are more messages to handle per time unit. We also observe that the CPU usage of
XPaxos is higher than that of other protocols, due to the use of digital signatures. Nevertheless, this
cost remains very reasonable: never more than half of the eight cores available on the experimental
machines were used. Note that this cost could probably be significantly reduced by using GPUs, as
recently proposed on the EC2 platform. Moreover, compared to BFT protocols (PBFT and Zyzzyva),
while CPU usage of XPaxos is higher, XPaxos also sustains a significantly higher throughput.
5.4 Performance under faults
In this section, we analyze the behavior of XPaxos under faults. We run the 1/0 micro-benchmark on
three replicas (CA, VA, JP) to tolerate one fault (see also Table 4). The experiment starts with CA
and VA as active replicas, and with 2500 clients in CA. At time 180 sec, we crash the follower, VA. At
time 300 sec, we crash the CA replica. At time 420 sec, we crash the third replica, JP. Each replica
recovers 20 sec after having crashed. Moreover, the timeout 2∆ (used during state transfer in view
change, Section 4.3) is set to 2.5 sec (see Section 5.1.1). We show the throughput of XPaxos in function
of time in Figure 9, which also indicates the active replicas for each view. We observe that after each
crash, the system performs a view change that lasts less than 10 sec, which is very reasonable in a
geo-distributed setting. This fast execution of the view-change subprotocol is a consequence of lazy
replication in XPaxos that keeps passive replicas updated. We also observe that the throughput of
XPaxos changes with the views. This is because the latencies between the primary and the follower
and between the primary and clients vary from view to view.
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Figure 9: XPaxos under faults.
5.5 Macro-benchmark: ZooKeeper
To assess the impact of our work on real-life applications, we measured the performance achieved
when replicating the ZooKeeper coordination service [19] using all protocols considered in this study:
Zyzzyva, PBFT, Paxos and XPaxos. We also compare with the native ZooKeeper performance, when
the system is replicated using the built-in Zab protocol [20]. This protocol is crash-resilient and
requires 2t + 1 replicas to tolerate t faults.
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We used the ZooKeeper 3.4.6 codebase. The integration of the various protocols inside ZooKeeper
was carried out by replacing the Zab protocol. For fair comparison to native ZooKeeper, we made
a minor modification to native ZooKeeper to force it to use (and keep) a given node as primary. To
focus the comparison on the performance of replication protocols, and avoid hitting other system
bottlenecks (such as storage I/O that is not very efficient in virtualized cloud environments), we store
ZooKeeper data and log directories on a volatile tmpfs file system. The configuration tested tolerates
one fault (t = 1). ZooKeeper clients were located in the same region as the primary (CA). Each client
invokes 1 kB write operations in a closed loop.
Figure 10 depicts the results. The X-axis represents the throughput in kops/sec. The Y-axis
represents the latency in ms. In this macro-benchmark, we find that Paxos and XPaxos clearly
outperform BFT protocols and that XPaxos achieves a performance close to that of Paxos. More
surprisingly, we can see that XPaxos is more efficient than the built-in Zab protocol, although the
latter only tolerates crash faults. For both protocols, the bottleneck in the WAN setting is the
bandwidth at the leader, but the leader in Zab sends requests to all other 2t replicas whereas the
XPaxos leader sends requests only to t followers, which yields a higher peak throughput for XPaxos.
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Figure 10: Latency vs. throughput for the ZooKeeper application (t = 1).
6 Reliability Analysis
In this section, we illustrate the reliability guarantees of XPaxos by analytically comparing them with
those of the state-of-the-art asynchronous CFT and BFT protocols. For simplicity of the analysis,
we consider the fault states of the machines to be independent and identically distributed random
variables.
We denote the probability that a replica is correct (resp., crash faulty) by pcorrect (resp., pcrash).
The probability that a replica is benign is pbenign = pcorrect + pcrash. Hence, a replica is non-crash
faulty with probability pnon-crash = 1− pbenign.
Besides, we assume there is a probability psynchrony that a replica is synchronous, where psynchrony
is a function of ∆, the network, and the system environment. Therefore, the probability that a replica
is partitioned equals 1− psynchrony.
Based on the assumption that network faults and machine faults occur independently, it is straight-
forward to reason for a given machine, pbenign and pcorrect are independent from psynchrony. Hence, the
probability that a machine is available (i.e., correct and synchronous) is pavailable = pcorrect×psynchrony.
Aligned with the industry practice, we measure reliability guarantees and coverage of fault scenar-
ios using nines of reliability. Specifically, we distinguish nines of consistency and nines of availability
and use these measures to compare different fault models. We introduce a function 9of(p) that turns
a probability p into the corresponding number of “nines”, by letting 9of(p) = b− log10(1 − p)c. For
example, 9of(0.999) = 3. For brevity, 9benign stands for 9of(pbenign), and so on, for other probabilities
of interest. Beyond the analysis and examples that follow, Appendix D contains additional examples
of practical values of nines of reliability achieved by XFT, CFT and BFT protocols.
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6.1 Consistency
We start with the number of nines of consistency for an asynchronous CFT protocol, denoted
by 9ofC(CFT ) = 9of(P [CFT is consistent]). As P [CFT is consistent] = pnbenign, a straightforward
calculation yields:
9ofC(CFT ) =
⌊
− log10(1− pbenign)− log10(
n−1∑
i=0
pibenign)
⌋
,
which gives 9ofC(CFT ) ≈ 9benign − dlog10(n)e for values of pbenign close to 1, when pibenign decreases
slowly. As a rule of thumb, for small values of n, i.e., n < 10, we have 9ofC(CFT ) ≈ 9benign − 1.
In other words, in typical configurations, where few faults are tolerated [13], a CFT system as a
whole loses one nine of consistency from the likelihood that a single replica is benign.
6.1.1 XPaxos vs. CFT
We now quantify the advantage of XPaxos over asynchronous CFT. From Table. 1, if there is no non-
crash fault, or there are no more than t faults (machine faults or network faults), XPaxos is consistent,
i.e.,
P [XPaxos is consistent] = pnbenign +
t=bn−1
2
c∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
pinon-crash×
t−i∑
j=0
(
n− i
j
)
pjcrash × pn−i−jcorrect ×
t−i−j∑
k=0
(
n− i− j
k
)
pn−i−j−ksynchrony × (1− psynchrony)k.
To quantify the difference between XPaxos and CFT more tangibly, we calculated 9ofC(XPaxos)
and 9ofC(CFT ) for all values of 9benign, 9correct and 9synchrony (9benign ≥ 9correct) between 1 and 20 in
the special cases where t = 1 and t = 2, which are most relevant in practice. For t = 1, we observed
the following relation:
9ofC(XPaxost=1)− 9ofC(CFTt=1) =
9correct − 1, 9benign > 9synchrony and
9synchrony = 9correct,
min(9synchrony, 9correct), otherwise.
9ofC(XPaxost=2)− 9ofC(CFTt=2) =
2× 9correct − 2, 9benign > 9synchrony and
9synchrony = 9correct > 1,
2× 9correct, 9synchrony > 2× 9benign and
9benign = 9correct,
2×min(9synchrony, 9correct)− 1, otherwise.
Hence, for t = 1 we observe that the number of nines of consistency XPaxos adds on top of CFT
is proportional to the nines of probability for correct or synchronous machine. The added nines are
not directly related to pbenign, although pbenign ≥ pcorrect must hold.
Example 1. When pbenign = 0.9999 and pcorrect = psynchrony = 0.999, we have pnon-crash = 0.0001 and
pcrash = 0.0009. In this example, 9 × pnon-crash = pcrash, i.e., if a machine suffers a faults 10 times,
then one of these is a non-crash fault and the rest are crash faults. In this case, 9ofC(CFTt=1) =
9benign−1 = 3, whereas 9ofC(XPaxost=1)−9ofC(CFTt=1) = 9correct−1 = 2, i.e., 9ofC(XPaxost=1) = 5.
XPaxos adds 2 nines of consistency on top of CFT and achieves 5 nines of consistency in total.
17
Example 2. In a slightly different example, let pbenign = psynchrony = 0.9999 and pcorrect = 0.999, i.e.,
the network behaves more reliably than in Example 1. 9ofC(CFTt=1) = 9benign − 1 = 3, whereas
9ofC(XPaxost=1) − 9ofC(CFTt=1) = pcorrect = 3, i.e., 9ofC(XPaxost=1) = 6. XPaxos adds 3 nines of
consistency on top of CFT and achieves 6 nines of consistency in total.
6.1.2 XPaxos vs. BFT
Recall that (see Table 1) SMR in asynchronous BFT model is consistent whenever no more than
one-third machines are non-crash faulty. Hence,
P [BFT is consistent] =
t=bn−1
3
c∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
(1− pbenign)i × pn−ibenign.
We first examine the conditions under which XPaxos has stronger consistency guarantees than
BFT. Fixing the value t of tolerated faults, we observe that P [XPaxos is consistent] > P [BFT is consistent]
is equivalent to:
p2t+1benign +
t∑
i=1
(
2t + 1
i
)
pinon-crash ×
t−i∑
j=0
(
2t + 1− i
j
)
pjcrash×
p2t+1−i−jcorrect ×
t−i−j∑
k=0
(
2t + 1− i− j
k
)
p2t+1−i−j−ksynchrony ×
(1− psynchrony)k >
t∑
i=0
(
3t + 1
i
)
p3t+1−ibenign (1− pbenign)i.
In the special case when t = 1, the above inequality simplifies to
pavailable > p
1.5
benign.
Hence, for t = 1, XPaxos has stronger consistency guarantees than any asynchronous BFT protocol
whenever the probability that a machine is available is larger than 1.5 power of the probability that a
machine is benign. This is despite the fact that BFT is more expensive than XPaxos as t = 1 implies
4 replicas for BFT and only 3 for XPaxos.
In terms of nines of consistency, again for t = 1 and t = 2, we calculated the difference in
consistency between XPaxos and BFT SMR, for all values of 9benign, 9correct and 9synchrony ranging
between 1 and 20, and observed the following relation:
9ofC(BFTt=1)− 9ofC(XPaxost=1) =
9benign − 9correct + 1, 9benign > 9synchrony and
9synchrony = 9correct,
9benign −min(9correct, 9synchrony), otherwise.
9ofC(BFTt=2)− 9ofC(XPaxost=2) =
2× (9benign − 9correct) + 1, 9benign > 9synchrony and
9synchrony = 9correct,
−1, 9synchrony > 2× 9benign
and 9benign = 9correct,
2× (9benign −min(9correct, 9synchrony)), otherwise.
Note that in cases where XPaxos guarantees better consistency than BFT (pavailable > p
1.5
benign), it
is only “slightly” better and does not materialize in additional nines.
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Example 1 (cont’d.). Building upon our example, pbenign = 0.9999 and psynchrony = pcorrect = 0.999,
we have 9ofC(BFTt=1) − 9ofC(XPaxost=1) = 9benign − 9synchrony + 1 = 2, i.e., 9ofC(XPaxost=1) = 5
and 9ofC(BFTt=1) = 7. BFT brings 2 nines of consistency on top of XPaxos.
Example 2 (cont’d.). When pbenign = psynchrony = 0.9999 and pcorrect = 0.999, we have 9ofC(BFTt=1)−
9ofC(XPaxost=1) = 1, i.e., 9ofC(XPaxost=1) = 6 and 9ofC(BFTt=1) = 7. XPaxos has one nine of
consistency less than BFT (albeit the only 7th).
6.2 Availability
Then, we quantify the stronger availability guarantees of XPaxos over asynchronous CFT and BFT
protocols. We define the number of nines of availability for protocol X, as 9ofA(X) = 9of(P [X is available]).
Recalling that whenever bn−12 c+ 1 active replicas in synchronous group are available, XPaxos can
make progress despite passive replicas are benign or not, partitioned or not (see Table 1). Thus, we
have P [XPaxos is available] =
n∑
i=bn−1
2
c+1
(
n
i
)
piavailable × (1− pavailable)n−i.
6.2.1 XPaxos vs. CFT
a CFT protocol (e.g., Paxos) is available whenever n− bn−12 c machines are correct and synchronous,
plus other machines are benign (see Table 1). Hence, P [CFT is available] =
n∑
i=n−bn−1
2
c
(
n
i
)
piavailable ×
(pbenign − pavailable)n−i.
Similarly to consistency analysis, we calculated 9ofA(CFT ) and 9ofA(XPaxos) for all values of
9available and 9benign between 1 and 20 in the cases where t = 1 and t = 2. Notice that pavailable < pbenign
is always true, i.e., 9available < 9benign. We observed the following relation for t = 1:
9ofA(XPaxost=1)− 9ofA(CFTt=1) =
max(2× 9available − 9benign, 0).
When t = 2, we observed:
9ofA(XPaxost=2) = 3× 9available − 1,
9ofA(XPaxost=2)− 9ofA(CFTt=2) =
3× 9available − 9benign, 9benign < 3× 9available,
1, 3× 9available ≤ 9benign < 4× 9available,
0, 9benign ≥ 4× 9available.
Example. When pavailable = 0.999 and pbenign = 0.99999, we have 9ofA(XPaxost=1)− 9ofA(CFTt=1) =
1, i.e., 9ofA(XPaxost=1) = 5 and 9ofA(CFTt=1) = 4. XPaxos adds 1 nine of availability on top of
CFT and achieves 5 nines of availability in total. Besides, XPaxos adds 2 nines of availability on top
of individual machine availability.
6.2.2 XPaxos vs. BFT
From Table 1, an asynchronous BFT protocol is available when n − bn−13 c machines are available
despite faults of other machines. Thus, P [BFT is available] =
n∑
i=n−bn−1
3
c
(
n
i
)
piavailable×(1−pavailable)n−i.
We calculated 9ofA(XPaxos) and 9ofA(BFT ) for all values of 9available between 1 and 20 in the
cases when t = 1 and t = 2. In this comparison 9benign does not matter. When t = 1,
9ofA(XPaxost=1) = 9ofA(BFTt=1) = 2× 9available − 1.
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On the other hand, when t = 2,
9ofA(XPaxost=2) = 9ofA(BFTt=2) + 1 = 3× 9available − 1.
Hence, when t = 1, XPaxos has the same number of nines of availability as BFT. When t = 2,
XPaxos adds 1 nine of availability to BFT.
7 Related work and concluding remarks
In this paper, we introduced XFT, a novel fault-tolerance model that allows the design of efficient
protocols that tolerate non-crash faults. We demonstrated XFT through XPaxos, a novel state-
machine replication protocol that features many more nines of reliability than the best crash-fault-
tolerant (CFT) protocols with roughly the same communication complexity, performance and resource
cost. Namely, XPaxos uses 2t + 1 replicas and provides all the reliability guarantees of CFT, but is
also capable of tolerating non-crash faults, as long as a majority of XPaxos replicas are correct and
can communicate synchronously among each other.
As XFT is entirely realized in software, it is fundamentally different from an established approach
that relies on trusted hardware for reducing the resource cost of BFT to 2t + 1 replicas only [15, 30,
21, 38].
XPaxos is also different from PASC [14], which makes CFT protocols tolerate a subset of Byzantine
faults using ASC-hardening. ASC-hardening modifies an application by keeping two copies of the state
at each replica. It then tolerates Byzantine faults under the “fault diversity” assumption, i.e., that
a fault will not corrupt both copies of the state in the same way. Unlike XPaxos, PASC does not
tolerate Byzantine faults that affect the entire replica (e.g., both state copies).
In this paper, we did not explore the impact on varying the number of tolerated faults per fault
class. In short, this approach, known as the hybrid fault model and introduced in [37] distinguishes
the threshold of non-crash faults (say b) despite which safety should be ensured, from the threshold
t of faults (of any class) despite which the availability should be ensured (where often b ≤ t). The
hybrid fault model and its refinements [11, 34] appear orthogonal to our XFT approach.
Specifically, Visigoth Fault Tolerance (VFT) [34] is a recent refinement of the hybrid fault model.
Besides having different thresholds for non-crash and crash faults, VFT also refines the space between
network synchrony and asynchrony by defining the threshold of network faults that a VFT protocol
can tolerate. VFT is, however, different from XFT in that it fixes separate fault thresholds for non-
crash and network faults. This difference is fundamental rather than notational, as XFT cannot be
expressed by choosing specific values of VFT thresholds. For instance, XPaxos can tolerate, with
2t+ 1 replicas, t partitioned replicas, t non-crash faults and t crash faults, albeit not simultaneously.
Specifying such requirements in VFT would yield at least 3t+ 1 replicas. In addition, VFT protocols
have more complex communication patterns than XPaxos. That said, many of the VFT concepts
remain orthogonal to XFT. It would be interesting to explore interactions between the hybrid fault
model (including its refinements such as VFT) and XFT in the future.
Going beyond the research directions outlined above, this paper opens also other avenues for
future work. For instance, many important distributed computing problems that build on SMR, such
as distributed storage and blockchain, deserve a novel look at them through the XFT prism.
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Appendix A XPaxos example execution
s0
s1
s2
3. COMMIT: 
<r0>
2. COMMIT: 
<r0,r1,r2>
6. COMMIT : 
<r0,r3>
view i+1view i
9. <r0,r3,r2,r1>
view i+2
5. CommitLog: 
<r0>
8. <r0,r3>
VC
view-change
VC
4. network 
fault
1. PREPARE: 
<r0,r1,r2>
7. non-crash 
fault
8. <r0,r1,r2>
8. CommitLog :
<r0>
5. <>
6.<r0,r3>
9. COMMIT :
<r0,r3,r2,r1>
fault
(a) without FD
s0
s1
s2
3. COMMIT : 
<r0>
2. COMMIT : 
<r0,r1,r2>
view i+1
6. <r0,r1,r2,r3>
view i view i+2
5. CommtLog
& PrepareLog : 
<r0,r1,r2>
7. <r0,r1,r2>
VC VC
5. <>
4. network 
fault
1. PREPARE : 
<r0,r1,r2>
7. <r0,r1,r2,r3>
fault detected
6. COMMIT :
<r0,r1,r2,r3>
7. CommtLog
& PrepareLog :
<r0,r1,r2>
7. non-crash 
fault
(b) with FD
Figure 11: XPaxos example. The view is changed from i to i + 2, due to the network fault of s1 and
the non-crash fault of s0, respectively.
In Fig. 11 we give an example of XPaxos execution when t = 1. The role of each replica in each
view is shown in Table 2.
In Fig. 11a, view change phase proceeds without fault detection. Upon the primary s0 receives
requests r0, r1, and r2 from clients, s0 prepares these requests locally and sends commit messages to
the follower s1. Then, s1 commits r0, r1, and r2 locally and sends commit messages to s0. Because
of a network fault, s0 only receives commit message of r0 in a timely manner, thus the view change
phase to i + 1 is activated by s0. During view change to i + 1, s0 sends the view-change message
with commit log of r0 to all active replicas in view i + 1 (i.e., s0 and s2). In view i + 1, r3 is further
committed by s0 and s2. After that, s0 is under non-crash fault and the view is changed to i + 2.
During view change to i+2, s1 and s2 provide all their commit logs to new active replicas (i.e., s1 and
s2), whereas non-crash faulty replica s0 only reports the commit log of r0. Outside anarchy, requests
r0 and r3 are committed in new view i+ 2 by receiving the view-change message from s2. Request
r3 is also committed by receiving the view-change message from s1. In view i + 2, r1 is finally
committed by every active replica.
In example of Figure 11b, XPaxos fault detection is enabled. In view i, the execution is the same
as in Figure 11a. During view change to i+1, commit log of r0 and prepare logs of r1 and r2 are sent
by s0, which are committed by s0 and s2 in view i + 1, as well as the new request r3. The same as
before, s0 is non-crash faulty and the view is changed to i + 2. During view change to i + 2, commit
logs of r0, r1, r2 and r3 are sent by s2. At the same time, because of missing prepare log of r3, the
fault of s0 is detected with the help of the view-change message from s2.
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Appendix B XPaxos pseudocode
In this appendix we give the pseudocode of XPaxos. For simplicity reason, we assume that signa-
ture/MAC attached to each message always correctly verifies. Figure 12 gives the definition of message
fields and local variables for all components of XPaxos. Readers can refer to Section 4 for protocol
description.
This appendix is organized incrementally as follows. Section B.1 gives the pseudocode of XPaxos
common case. Section B.2 gives the pseudocode of the view change mechanism. Section B.3 describes
and gives the pseudocode of clients’ request retransmission mechanism that deals with faulty primary.
Finally, Section B.4 depicts the modification to the view change protocol to enable Fault Detection
and gives the pseudocode.
Common case :
c, op, tsc - id of the client, operation, client timestamp
reqc - ongoing request at client c
n - total number of replicas
Π - set of n replicas
i - current view number
sj - replica id
sgi - set of t + 1 replicas in synchronous group in view i
psi - the primary in view i (psi ∈ sgi)
fsi - the follower in view i for t = 1 (fsi ∈ sgi)
fski - the followers in view i for t ≥ 2 (fski ∈ sgi)
req - client request
rep - reply of client request
snsj - sequence number prepared at replica sj
exsj - sequence number executed at replica sj
D(m) - digest of a message m
PrepareLogsj - array of prepared proof at replica sj
CommitLogsj - array of commit proofs at replica sj
View change :
SusSetsj - set of suspect messages cached for view-change at replica sj
timerneti - network establishment timer for view i
∆ - maximum message delay between two correct replicas, beyond which a network fault is declared
timervci - view-change timer in view change to i
V CSetisj - set of view-change messages collected in view change to i at replica sj
CommitLogisj - array of most recent commit proofs selected from V CSet
i
sj at replica sj
End(log) - end index of array log
Fault detection :
FinalProofsj - array of t+1 vc-confirm messages which prove that ∀sk ∈ sgi collected the same V CSetisk
presj - the view number in which PrepareLogsj is generated
FinalSetisj - set of t + 1 vc-final messages collected in view change to i at replica sj
PrepareLogisj - array of most recent prepare proof selected from V CSet
i
sj at replica sj
Figure 12: XPaxos common case: Message fields and local variables.
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B.1 Common case
In common case, we assume that all replicas are in the same view. Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2
describe the common case protocol when t = 1 and t ≥ 2, respectively. Figure 2 gives the message
pattern.
Algorithm 1 Common case when t = 1.
Initialization:
client : tsc ← 0; reqc ← nil
replica : snsj ← 0; exsj ← 0;PrepareLogsj = [];CommitLogsj = []
1: upon invocation of propose(op) at client c do
2: inc(tsc)
3: send reqc ← 〈replicate, op, tsc, c〉σc to the primary psi ∈ sgi
4: start timerc
5: upon reception of req = 〈replicate, op, ts, c〉σc from client c at psi do /* primary */
6: inc(snpsi)
7: mpsi ← 〈commit, D(req), snpsi , i〉σpsi
8: PrepareLogpsi [snpsi ]← 〈req,mpsi〉
9: send 〈req,mpsi〉 to the follower fsi
10: upon reception of 〈req,mpsi = 〈commit, dreq, sn, i〉σpsi 〉 from the primary psi at fsi do /* follower
*/
11: if sn = snfsi + 1 and D(req) = dreq then
12: inc(snfsi)
13: rep← execute req
14: inc(exfsi)
15: mfsi ← 〈commit, D(req), sn, i, req.tsc, D(rep)〉σfsi
16: CommitLogfsi [sn]← 〈req,mpsi ,mfsi〉
17: send mfsi to the primary psi
18: upon reception of mfsi = 〈commit, dreq, sn, i, ts, drep〉σfsi from the follower fsi at psi do
19: if D(PrepareLogpsi [sn].req) = dreq then
20: CommitLogpsi [sn]← 〈req,mpsi ,mfsi〉
21: upon CommitLogpsi [expsi + 1] 6= nil at psi do
22: inc(expsi)
23: rep← execute CommitLogpsi [expsi ].req
24: if D(rep) = CommitLogpsi [expsi ].mfsi .drep then
25: send 〈〈reply, sn, i, ts, rep〉µpsi,c ,mfsi〉 to CommitLogpsi [expsi ].req.c
26: upon reception of 〈rpsi ,mfsi〉 from the primary psi at client c, where
rpsi = 〈reply, sn, i, ts, rep〉µpsi,c
mfsi = 〈commit, d′req, sn′, i′, ts′, drep〉σfsi do
27: if sn = sn′ and i = i′ and ts = ts′ = req.tsc and D(rep) = drep then
28: deliver rep
29: stop timerc
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Algorithm 2 Common case when t > 1.
Initialization:
client : tsc ← 0; reqc ← nil
replica : snsj ← 0; exsj ← 0;PrepareLogsj = [];CommitLogsj = []
1: upon invocation of propose(op) at client c do
2: inc(tsc)
3: send reqc ← 〈replicate, op, tsc, c〉σc to the primary psi ∈ sgi
4: start timerc
5: upon reception of req = 〈replicate, op, ts, c〉σc from client c at psi do /* primary */
6: inc(snpsi)
7: mpsi ← 〈prepare, D(req), snpsi , i〉σpsi
8: PrepareLogpsi [sn]← 〈req,mpsi〉
9: send 〈req,mpsi〉 to fski ∈ sgi
10: upon reception of 〈req,mpsi = 〈prepare, dreq, sn, i〉σpsi 〉 from the primary psi at fski do /*
follower */
11: if sn = snfski + 1 and D(req) = dreq then
12: inc(snfski )
13: PrepareLogfski [sn]← 〈req,mpsi〉
14: mfski ← 〈commit, D(req), sn, i, fski 〉σfski
15: send mfski to ∀sk ∈ sgi
16: upon reception of mfski = 〈commit, dreq, sn, i, fski 〉σfski from every follower fs
k
i ∈ sgi at sj ∈ sgi do
17: CommitLogsj [sn]← 〈req,mpsi ,mfs1i ...mfsfi 〉
18: upon CommitLogsj [exsj + 1] 6= nil at sj do
19: inc(exsj )
20: rep← execute CommitLogsj [exsj ].req
21: send 〈reply, sn, i, req.tsc, rep〉µsj,c to client c, where c = CommitLogsj [exsj ].req.c)
22: upon reception of t + 1 reply messages 〈reply, sn, i, ts, rep〉µsj,c at client c do
23: if t + 1 reply messages are with the same sn, i, ts and rep and ts = req.tsc then
24: deliver rep
25: stop timerc
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B.2 View-change
The message pattern of view-change w/o fault detection is given in Figure 3. Algorithm 3 shows the
corresponding pseudocode. The description of view change can be found in Section 4.3.
Algorithm 3 View change at replica sj .
Initialization:
SusSetsj ← ∅;V CSetisj ← ∅;CommitLogisj ← []
1: upon suspicion of view i and sj ∈ sgi do
2: send 〈suspect, i, sj〉σsj to ∀sk ∈ Π
3: upon reception of m = 〈suspect, i′, sk〉σsk and sk ∈ sgi′ do
4: SusSetsj ← SusSetsj ∪ {m}
5: forward m to ∀sk ∈ Π
6: upon ∃〈suspect, i, sk〉σsk ∈ SusSetsj do /* enter each view in order */
7: inc(i) (i.e., ignore any message in preceding view)
8: send 〈view-change, i, sj , CommitLogsj 〉σsj to ∀sk ∈ sgi
9: if sj ∈ sgi then
10: start timerneti ← 2∆
11: upon reception of m = 〈view-change, i, sk, CommitLog〉σsk from replica sk do
12: V CSetisj ← V CSetisj ∪ {m}
13: upon |V CSetisj | = n or (expiration of timerneti and |V CSetisj | ≥ n− t) do
14: send 〈vc-final, i, sj , V CSetisj 〉σsj to ∀sk ∈ sgi
15: start timervci
16: upon reception of m∗ = 〈vc-final, i, sk, V CSet〉σsk from every sk ∈ sgi do
17: V CSetisj ← V CSetisj ∪ {∀m : m ∈ V CSet in any mk}
18: for sn : 1..End(∀CommitLog|∃m ∈ V CSetisj : CommitLog is in m) do
19: CommitLogisj [sn]← CommitLog[sn] with the highest view number
20: if sj = psi then /* primary */
21: for sn : 1..End(CommitLogisj ) do
22: req ← CommitLogisj [sn].req
23: PrepareLog[sn]← 〈req, 〈prepare, D(req), sn, i〉σpsi 〉
24: send 〈new-view, i, P repareLog〉σpsi to ∀sk ∈ sgi
25: upon reception of 〈new-view, i, P repareLog〉σpsi from the primary psi do
26: if PrepareLog is matching with CommitLogisj then
27: PrepareLogsj ← PrepareLog
28: reply and process ∀m ∈ PrepareLog as in common case
29: snsj ← End(PrepareLog)
30: exsj ← End(PrepareLog)
31: stop timervci
32: else
33: suspect view i
34: upon expiration of timervci do
35: suspect view i
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B.3 Request retransmission
In order to provide availability with respect to faulty primary or followers, as well as long-lived network
faults within the synchronous group, we propose a request retransmission mechanism which broadcasts
the request to all active replicas upon retransmission timer expires at client side. Retransmission
mechanism requires every active replica to monitor the progress. In case a request is not executed
and replied in a timely manner, the correct active replica in the synchronous group will eventually
suspect the view.
More specifically (the pseudocode is given in Algorithm 4), if a client c does not receive the
matching replies of request reqc in a timely manner, c re-sends reqc to all active replicas in current
view i by 〈re-send,reqc〉. Any active replica sj ∈ sgi, upon receiving 〈re-send,reqc〉 from c, (1)
forwards reqc to the primary psi ∈ sgi if sj 6= psi, (2) starts a timer timerreqc locally, and (3) asks
each active replica to sign the reply. Upon timerreqc expires and the active replica sj ∈ sgi has
not received t + 1 signed replies, sj suspects view i and sends the suspect message to the client c;
otherwise, sj forwards t + 1 signed replies to client c.
Upon receiving suspect message m for view i, client c forwards m to every active replica in view
i+ 1. This step serves to guarantee that the view-change can actually happen at all correct replicas.
Then client c forwards reqc to the primary of view i + 1.
Algorithm 4 Client request retransmission.
1: upon expiration of timerc at client c do
2: send 〈re-send,reqc〉 to ∀sj ∈ sgi
3: upon reception of 〈re-send,reqc〉 at sj ∈ sgi do
4: if sj 6= psi then
5: send reqc to psi ∈ sgi
6: start timerreqc
7: ask ∀sj ∈ sgi to sign the reply of reqc
8: upon expiration of timerreqc at replica sj ∈ sgi do
9: suspect view i
10: send 〈suspect, i, sj〉σsj to client c
11: upon reception of m = 〈suspect, i, sk〉σsk at client c and sk ∈ sgi and c is in view i do
12: enter view i + 1
13: send m to ∀sj ∈ sgi+1
14: send reqc to psi+1
15: start timerc
16: upon execution of reqc at sj
a do
/* sign the reply by each active replica */
17: send 〈reply, sn, i, req.tsc, rep〉σsj to ∀sj ∈ sgi
18: upon reception of mk = 〈reply, sn, i, ts, rep〉σsk from every sk ∈ sgi at replica sj do
/* collect t + 1 signed replies */
19: if m1,m2, ...,mt+1 are with the same sn, i, ts and rep then
20: replies← {m1,m2, ...,mt+1}
21: send 〈signed-reply, replies〉 to client c
22: stop timerreqc
aby line 13 or 23 in Algorithm 1 or line 20 in Algorithm 2
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Figure 13: Message pattern of XPaxos view-change with fault detection: vc-confirm phase is added;
synchronous group is changed from (s0,s1) to (s0,s2).
B.4 Fault detection
In this section we describe XPaxos with Fault Detection (FD). Specifically, in order to detect all the
fatal faults that can possibly violate consistency in anarchy, view change to i + 1 with FD includes
the following modifications.
• Every replica sj appends its prepare logs PrepareLogsj into the view-change message when
replying to active replicas in view i+1. Besides, synchronous group sgi+1 prepares and commits
requests piggybacked in commit or prepare logs. The selection rule is almost the same as in view
change without FD: for each sequence number sn, the request with the highest view number
i′ ≤ i is selected, either in a commit log or in a prepare log.
• XPaxos FD additionally inserts a vc-confirm phase after exchanging view-change messages
among active replicas in view i + 1, i.e., after receiving t + 1 vc-final messages (see Figure 3
and Figure 13 for the comparison). In vc-confirm phase, every active replica sj ∈ sgi+1
(1) detects potential faults in the view-change messages in V CSeti+1sj and adds the faulty
replica to set FSet; (2) removes faulty messages from V CSeti+1sj ; and, (3) signs and sends
〈vc-confirm, i+ 1, D(V CSeti+1sj )〉σsj to every active replica in sgi+1. Upon sj ∈ sgi+1 receives
t + 1 vc-confirm messages with matching D(V CSeti+1∗ ), sj (1) inserts the vc-confirm mes-
sages into set FinalProofsj [i+ 1]; and (2) prepares and commits the requests selected based on
V CSeti+1sj . FinalProofsj [i + 1] serves to prove that t + 1 active replicas in sgi have agreed on
the set of filtered view-change messages.
• Every replica sj appends FinalProofsj [i′] into the view-change message when replying to
active replicas in new view, where i′ is the view in which PrepareLogsj is generated. In case a
prepare log in PrepareLogsj is not consistent with some commit log, FinalProofsj [i] can prove
that there exists correct replica sj ∈ sgi′ which can prove the fault of the prepare log.
Algorithm 5 gives the modifications based on Algorithm 3 for XPaxos with fault detection mech-
anism. Algorithm 6 enumerates all types of faults that can and must be detected by correct active
replicas. Figure 13 gives the new message pattern.
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Algorithm 5 Modifications for fault detection at replica sj .
Initialization:
FinalProofsj ← []; presj ← 0;FinalSetisj ← ∅;PrepareLogisj ← [];FSet← []
/* replace line 8 in Algorithm 3 by : */
1: send m = 〈view-change, i, sj , CommitLogsj , P repareLogsj , F inalProofsj [presj ]〉σsj to
∀sk ∈ sgi
/* replace line 11 in Algorithm 3 by : */
2: upon reception of m = 〈view-change, i, sk, CommitLog, PrepareLog, F inalProof〉σsk from replica
sk do
/* replace lines 18∼24 in Algorithm 3 by : */
3: faultDetection(vcSetisj) /* refer to Algorithm 6 */
4: for ∀m : m ∈ vcSetisj and m from replica s ∈ FSet do
5: remove m from vcSetisj
6: send 〈vc-confirm, i,D(vcSetisj )〉σsj to ∀sk ∈ sgi
/* new event handler */
7: upon reception of m∗ = 〈vc-confirm, i, dvcSet〉σsk from every sk ∈ sgi do
8: if m1,m2, ...mf+1 are not with the same dvcSet then
9: suspect view i
10: return
11: FinalProofsj [i]← {m1,m2, ...mf+1}
12: for sn : 1..End(∀CommitLog|∃m ∈ V CSetisj : CommitLog is in m) do
13: CommitLogisj [sn]← CommitLog[sn] with the highest view number
14: for sn : 1..End(∀PrepareLog|∃m ∈ V CSetisj : PrepareLog is in m) do
15: PrepareLogisj [sn]← PrepareLog[sn] with the highest view number
16: if sj = psi then /* primary */
17: for sn : 1..End(PrepareLogisj |CommitLogisj ) do
18: req ← CommitLogisj [sn].req
19: if req = null or PrepareLogisj [sn] is generated in a higher view than CommitLog
i
sj [sn]
then
20: req ← PrepareLogisj [sn].req
21: PrepareLog[sn]← 〈req, 〈prepare, D(req), sn, i〉σsj 〉
22: send 〈new-view, i, P repareLog〉σsj to ∀sk ∈ sgi
/* replace line 26 in Algorithm 3 by : */
23: if PrepareLog is matching with CommitLogisj and PrepareLog
i
sj then
/* add this command after line 27 in Algorithm 3 : */
24: presj ← i /* update the view in which PrepareLogsj is generated */
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Algorithm 6 Fault detection function at replica sj .
1: function faultDetection(V CSet)
2: ∀sn and m,m′ ∈ V CSet from replicas sk and sk′ , respectively,
3: (state loss) if sk, sk′ ∈ sgi′ (i′ < i) and CommitLog′[sn] in m′ is generated in view i′ and
PrepareLog is in m and PrepareLog[sn] = nil then (sk is faulty)
4: send 〈state-loss, i, sk, sn,m,m′〉 to ∀sk′′ ∈ Π
5: add sk to FSet
6: (fork-I) if sk, sk′ ∈ sgi′ (i′ < i) and PrepareLog[sn] in m is generated in view i′′
and CommitLog′[sn] in m′ is generated in view i′ and ((i′′ = i′ and PrepareLog[sn].req 6=
CommitLog′[sn].req) or i′′ < i) then (sk is faulty)
7: send 〈fork-i, i, sk, sn,m,m′〉 to ∀sk′′ ∈ Π
8: add sk to FSet
9: (fork-II-query) if PrepareLog[sn] in m is generated in view i′′ (i′′ < i) and CommitLog′[sn]
in m′ is generated in view i′ (i′ < i′′ < i) and (PrepareLog[sn] = null or PrepareLog[sn].req 6=
CommitLog′[sn].req) then (sk might be faulty)
10: send 〈fork-ii-query, i, sk, sn,m〉 to ∀sk′′ ∈ sgi′′
11: wait for 2∆ time
12: upon reception of 〈fork-ii-query, i, sk, sn,m〉 at sj , where finalProof in m is generated in view
i′′ and sj ∈ sgi′′ do
13: if PrepareLog[sn] in m is not consistent with V CSeti
′′
sj then
14: send 〈fork-ii, i, sk, sn,m, finalProofsj [i′′], finalSeti
′′
sj 〉 to ∀sk ∈ Π
15: upon reception of 〈fork-ii, i, sk, sn,m, finalProof, finalSet〉 do
16: add sk to FSet
17: upon reception of state-loss, fork-i or fork-ii message m do
18: forward m to ∀sk ∈ Π
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Appendix C XPaxos correctness proof
In this appendix, we first prove safety (consistency) and liveness (availability) properties of XPaxos.
To prove safety (Section C.1), we show that when XPaxos is outside anarchy, consistency is guaranteed.
In liveness section (Section C.2), we show that XPaxos can make progress with at most t faulty replicas
and any number of faulty clients, if eventually the system is synchronous (i.e., eventual synchrony).
Then, in Section C.3, we prove that the fault detection mechanism is strong completeness and
strong accuracy outside anarchy, with respect to non-crash faults which can violate consistency in
anarchy.
We use the notation in Figure 14 to facilitate our proof of XPaxos. All predicates in Figure 14 are
defined with respect to benign clients and replicas.
c, req, rep : Client c, request req from client and reply rep of req.
delivered(c, req, rep) - Client c delivers response rep for request req.
before(req, req′) - Request req is executed prior to request req′, i.e., req′ is executed based on execution of
req.
sgi : the set of replicas in synchronous group i.
accepted(c, req, rep, i) - Client c receives t + 1 matching replies of req from every active replica in view i.
prefix(req, req′, sj) - Request req′ is executed after execution of request req at replica sj .
committed(req, i, sn, sj) - Active replica sj ∈ sgi has received f+1 matching prepare or commit messages.
sg-committed(req, i, sn) - ∀ benign active replica sj ∈ sgi: committed(req, i, sn, sj).
executed(req, i, sn, sj) - Active replica sj ∈ sgi has executed request req at sequence number sn in its state.
sg-executed(req, i, sn) - ∀ benign active replica sj ∈ sgi: executed(req, i, sn, sj).
prepared(req, i, sn, sj) - Active replica sj ∈ sgi has received prepare message at sn for req.
Figure 14: XPaxos proof notation.
C.1 Safety (Consistency)
Theorem 1. (safety) If delivered(c, req, rep), delivered(c′, req′, rep′), and req 6= req′, then either
before(req, req′) or before(req′, req).
To prove the safety property, we start from Lemma 2 which shows a useful relation between
predicates delivered() and accepted().
Lemma 2. (view exists) delivered(c, req, rep) ⇔ ∃ view i: accepted(c, req, rep, i).
Proof : By common case protocol Algorithm 1 lines:{26-29} and Algorithm 2 lines:{22-25}, client
c delivers a reply only upon it receives t+ 1 matching reply messages from all active replicas in the
same view. Conversely, upon client c receives t + 1 matching reply messages from active replicas in
the same view, it delivers the reply.
Lemma 3. (reply is correct) If accepted(c, req, rep, i), then rep is the reply of req executed by correct
replica.
Proof :
1. ∃sj ∈ sgi: sj is correct.
Proof : Assumption of at most t faulty replicas and |sgi| = t + 1.
2. Client c expects matching replies from t + 1 active replicas in sgi.
Proof : By common case protocol Algorithm 1 lines:{26-29} and Algorithm 2 lines:{22-25}.
3. Q.E.D.
Proof : By 1 and 2.
32
By Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, we assume ∃ view i for req and ∃i′ for req′, then we instead prove :
Theorem 2. (safety) If accepted(c, req, rep, i) and accepted(c′, req′, rep′, i′), then before(req, req′) or
before(req′, req).
Now we introduce sequence number.
Lemma 4. (sequence number exists) If accepted(c, req, rep, i), then ∃ sequence number sn: sg-
executed(req, i, sn).
Proof :
1. Client c accepts rep in view i as reply of req upon:
(1) c receives reply messages with matching ts, rep, sn and i; and,
(2) reply messages are attested by t + 1 active replicas in sgi.
Proof : By common case protocol Algorithm 1 lines:{26-29} and Algorithm 2 lines:{22-25}.
2. Benign active replica sj ∈ sgi sends replymessage for req only upon ∃sn : executed(req, i, sn, sj).
Proof : By common case protocol Algorithm 1 lines:{21-25} and Algorithm 2 lines:{18-21}.
3. Q.E.D.
Proof : By 1 and 2.
By Lemma 4, we assume ∃ sequence number sn for req and ∃sn′ for req′. Then we instead prove:
Theorem 3. (safety) If sg-executed(req, i, sn), sg-executed(req′, i′, sn′) and sn < sn′, then ∀ benign
active replica sj′ ∈ sgi′: prefix(req, req′, sj′).
Towards the proof of Theorem 3, we first prove several lemmas below (from Lemma 5 to Lemma 11).
Lemma 5 proves that if a request is executed by a benign active replica, then that request has
been committed by the same replica.
Lemma 5. If executed(req, i, sn, sj), then committed(req, i, sn, sj).
Proof : By common case protocol Algorithm 1 lines:{10-21} and Algorithm 2 lines:{10-18}, ev-
ery benign active replica first commits a request by receiving t + 1 matching prepare or commit
messages, then it executes the request based on committed order.
Lemma 6. (committed() is unique) If committed(req, i, sn, sj) and committed(req
′, i, sn, sj′), then
req = req′.
Proof : Proved by contradiction.
1. We assume ∃ requests req and req′ : committed(req, i, sn, sj), committed(req′, i, sn, sj′) and
req 6= req′.
Proof : Contradiction assumption.
2. ∃ correct active replica sk ∈ sgi : sk has sent prepare or commit message for both req and
req′ at sn (i.e., sk has executed common case protocol Algorithm 1 lines:{8-9} or Algorithm 1
lines:{15-17}, or Algorithm 2 lines:{7-9} or Algorithm 2 lines:{14-15}, for both req and req′).
Proof : By |sgi| = t + 1, ∃sk : sk is correct; then by 1, common case protocol Algorithm 1
lines:{18-20} or Algorithm 2 lines:{16-17}, and definition of committed().
3. Q.E.D.
Proof : By 2 and 1.
Lemma 7 locates at the heart of XPaxos safety proof, which is proved by induction. By Lemma 7
we show that, if request req is committed at sn by every (benign) active replica in the same view,
and, if request req′ is committed by any replica in the preceding view at sn, then req = req′.
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Lemma 7. (sg-committed() is durable) If sg-committed(req, i, sn), then ∀i′ > i : if committed(req′, i′, sn, sj′)
then req = req′.
Proof :
1. We assume ∀i′′ and sj′′ : i ≤ i′′ < i′ and sj′′ ∈ sgi′′ , if committed(req′′, i′′, sn, sj′′) then
req = req′′.
Proof : Inductive Hypothesis.
2. ∀ benign replica sj′ ∈ sgi′ : sj′ has been waiting for view-change messages from ∀sk ∈ Π
within 2∆ time.
Proof : By committed(req′, i′, sn, sj′), sk′ has generated prepare or commit message at sn; by
view change protocol Algorithm 3 lines:{23,26,28}, a benign active replica generates a prepare
or commit message in view i′ only upon the replica has executed Algorithm 3 lines:{16} in
view i′; then by Algorithm 3 lines:{13-15}.
3. ∃sj′ ∈ sgi′ : sj′ is correct.
Proof : By |sgi′ | = t + 1 and at most t faulty replicas.
4. During view change to i′, sj′ has collected view-change message m from a correct active replica
sj ∈ sgi.
Proof : By 2 and 3, view change protocol Algorithm 3 lines:{13-15} have been executed at sj′ ;
sj′ polls all replicas for view-change messages and waits for response from t+1 replicas as well
as the timer set to 2∆ to expire. Assume that sj′ has received view-change messages from
r ≥ 1 replicas in view i. The other t + 1 − r replicas in view i are either faulty or partitioned
based on definitions. Among r replicas which have replied, at most t − (t + 1 − r) = r − 1 are
faulty. Hence, at least one replica, say, sj ∈ sgi is correct and has replied with m.
5. m contains t+ 1 matching prepare or commit messages for request req′′ at sequence number
sn, generated in view i′′ ≥ i.
Proof : By Algorithm 3 lines:{6-7}, benign replicas process messages in ascending view order,
so that commit log at sn generated in view i will not be replaced by any commit log generated
in view i′′′ < i; then by 4 and sg-committed(req, i, sn).
6. In view i′, ∀sk′ ∈ sgi′ : sk′ can commit req′′, or any req′′′ which is committed in view i′′′ > i′′ at
sn.
Proof : By Algorithm 3 lines:{19} and 5.
7. req′′ = req′′′ = req.
Proof : By 4 and 5, req′′ is committed in i′′ and req′′′ is committed in i′′′, where i′′′ > i′′ ≥ i;
then by 1.
8. req′ = req.
Proof : By 6, 7 and committed(req′, i′, sn, sj′).
By Lemma 7 we can easily get Lemma 8.
Lemma 8. If sg-committed(req, i, sn) and sg-committed(req′, i′, sn), then req = req′.
Proof : By Lemma 7 and definition of sg-committed().
Lemma 9. If executed(req, i, sn, sj), then ∀sn′ < sn : ∃req′ s.t. committed(req′, i, sn′, sj).
Proof : By common case protocol Algorithm 1 lines:{21-22} and Algorithm 2 lines:{18-19},
correct active replicas execute requests based on order defined by committed sequence number; by
executed(req, i, sn, sj) and sn
′ < sn, executed(req′, i, sn′, sj); and, by Lemma 5.
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Lemma 10. (executed() in order) If committed(req, i, sn, sj), executed(req
′, i, sn′, sj) and sn < sn′,
then prefix(req, req′, sj).
Proof : By Lemma 9, ∃req′′ s.t. committed(req′′, i, sn, sj); by Lemma 6, req′′ = req; by common
case protocol Algorithm 1 lines:{21-22} and Algorithm 2 lines:{18-19}, benign active replicas exe-
cute requests based on order defined by committed sequence number sn and sn′; and, by sn < sn′.
Lemma 11. If sg-committed(req, i, sn), sg-executed(req′, i, sn′) and sn < sn′, then ∀ benign active
replica sj : prefix(req, req
′, sj).
Proof : By Lemma 10.
Now we can prove Theorem 3.
Proof :
1. sg-committed(req, i, sn) and sg-committed(req′, i′, sn′).
Proof : By sg-executed(req, i, sn), sg-executed(req′, i′, sn′) and Lemma 5.
When i < i′ :
2. sg-committed(req, i′, sn).
Proof : By sg-executed(req′, i′, sn′), Lemma 9 and sn < sn′, ∃req′′ : sg−committed(req′′, i′, sn);
then by Lemma 8, sg-committed(req, i, sn) and i < i′, req′′ = req.
3. ∀ benign active replica sj′ ∈ sgi′ : prefix(req, req′, sj′).
Proof : By sg-executed(req′, i′, sn′), 2, sn < sn′ and Lemma 11.
When i = i′ :
4. ∀ benign active replica sj ∈ sgi: prefix(req, req′, sj).
Proof : By 1, sg-executed(req′, i′, sn′), i = i′, sn < sn′ and Lemma 11.
When i > i′ :
5. ∃req′′ : sg-committed(req′′, i′, sn).
Proof : By Lemma 9, sg-executed(req′, i′, sn′) and sn < sn′.
6. req′′ = req.
Proof : By 5 and Lemma 8.
7. ∀ benign active replica sj′ ∈ sgi′ : prefix(req, req′, sj).
Proof : By 5, 6, sg-executed(req′, i′, sn′), sn < sn′ and Lemma 11.
8. Q.E.D.
Proof : By 3, 4 and 7.
C.2 Liveness (Availability)
Before proving liveness property, we first prove two Lemmas (12 and 13).
Lemma 12. If a correct client c issues a request req in view i, then eventually, either (1) accepted(c, req, rep, i)
or (2) XPaxos changes view to i + 1.
Proof :
1. We assume accepted(c, req, rep, i) is false, then we prove that eventually view i is changed to
i + 1.
Proof : Equivalent.
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2. Client c sends req to every active replica upon timerc expires.
Proof : By 1, c is correct, and Algorithm 4 lines:{1-2}.
3. No replica in sgi sent matching signed-reply message for req to client c.
Proof : By 1, c is correct and Algorithm 4 lines:{18-22}.
4. ∃ active replica sj ∈ sgi: sj is correct.
Proof : By assumption |sgi| = t + 1 and at most t faulty replicas.
5. sj has not received t + 1 matching signed reply messages for req.
Proof : By 3, 4 and Algorithm 4 lines:{18-22}.
Either,
6. sj starts timerreqc .
Proof : By 2, 4 and Algorithm 4 lines:{3,6}.
7. sj suspects view i when timerreqc expires.
Proof : By 4, 5, 6 and Algorithm 4 lines:{8-10}.
or,
8. sj starts timer
vc
i in view change to i.
Proof : By Algorithm 3 lines:{15}.
9. sj suspects view i when timer
vc
i expires.
Proof : By 2, 8 and Algorithm 3 lines:{34-35}.
10. Q.E.D.
Proof : By 1 and 7, 9.
Lemma 13. If a correct client c issues a request req in view i, the system is synchronous for a
sufficient time and ∀ active replica sj ∈ sgi: sj is correct, then eventually accepted(c, req, rep, i).
Proof :
1. All active replicas in sgi and c follows protocol correctly.
Proof : c is correct and ∀ active replica sj ∈ sgi: sj is correct.
2. No timer expires.
Proof : By 1 and the system is synchronous.
3. No view change happens.
Proof : By 1 and Algorithm 3 lines:{1-7}, no faulty replica in sgi, and no faulty passive replica
in view i can suspect view i deliberately; and by 2, no correct replica in sgi suspects view i.
4. accepted(c, req, rep, i).
Proof : By 3 and Lemma 12.
Theorem 4. (liveness) If a correct client c issues a request req, then eventually, delivered(c, req, rep).
Proof : Proved by Contradiction.
1. We assume delivered(c, req, rep) is always false.
Proof : Contradiction assumption.
2. If current view is i, then view is eventually changed to i + 1.
Proof : By 1, Lemma 2 and Lemma 12.
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3. View change is executed for infinite times.
Proof : By 1 and 2, Algorithm 4 lines:{11-15} and Algorithm 4 lines:{1-2}, correct client c
always multicasts suspect message and req to every active replica in new view.
4. Eventually the system is synchronous.
Proof : Eventual synchrony assumption.
5. ∃ view i′: ∀ active replica sj′ ∈ sgi′ s.t. sj′ is correct.
Proof : View change protocol is rounded among combinations of 2t + 1 replicas, among which
there exists one synchronous group containing only correct active replicas.
6. accepted(c, req, rep, i′).
Proof : By 3, 4, 5, Lemma 13 and c is correct.
7. Q.E.D.
Proof : By 1, 6, Lemma 2 and contradiction.
C.3 Fault detection (FD)
In this section we prove that the fault detection mechanism is strong completeness and strong accuracy
outside anarchy.
At first, in Definition 4 we define the type of messages which can possibly violate consistency in
anarchy.
Definition 4. (non-crash faulty message) In view change to i, a view-change message m from
replica sk is a non-crash faulty message if :
(i) m is sent to a correct active replica sj ∈ sgi;
(ii) ∃ view i′ < i and request req : sg − committed(req, i′, sn);
(iii) at least one of two properties below is satisfied :
(1) sk ∈ sgi′ and in m : PrepareLog[sn] is generated in view i′′ < i′; or,
(2) in m : PrepareLog[sn].req 6= req and PrepareLog[sn] is generated in view i′′ ≥ i′; and,
(iv) @i′′′ (i′′′ > i′′ and i′′′ > i′) and sk′′′ ∈ sgi′′′ : committed(req, i′′′, sn, sk′′′).
Then we can prove:
Lemma 14. If a view-change message m is not a non-crash faulty message, then m cannot violate
consistency in anarchy.
Proof : Proved by Contradiction.
1. If Definition 4 property (i) is not satisfied, then either m is sent to a non-crash faulty replica,
based on our model we have no assumption on non-crash faulty replicas, so m should not affect
the state of any correct replica; or m is sent to a crashed or passive replica, which just stops
processing or ignores m.
2. If Definition 4 property (ii) is not satisfied, then req has not been committed by some correct
replica in sgi′ , hence accepted(c, req, rep, i
′) is not true.
3. If neither of Definition 4 property (iii).(1) or (2) is satisfied, then either sk ∈ sgi′ and m
contains prepare log of req at sn generated in view i′′ ≥ i, so by Algorithm 5 lines:{11-21},
m facilitates req to be committed in view i; or, if sk /∈ sgi′ , then either PrepareLog[sn].req is
generated in i′′ < i′, even if PrepareLog[sn].req 6= req, based on Algorithm 5 lines:{13,14,18}
PrepareLog[sn].req cannot be selected in view change to i if no (faulty) replica in i′ sends
inconsistent message (e.g., a prepare log generated in view lower than i′ by sk′ ∈ sgi′), hence
we consider in this case sk is harmless; or i
′′ ≥ i and PrepareLog[sn].req = req, the argument
is the same as before.
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4. if Definition 4 property (iv) is not satisfied, then ∃i′′′ (i′′′ > i′′ and i′′′ > i′) and sk′′′ ∈ sgi′′′
: committed(req, i′′′, sn, sk′′′). In this case, to modify req committed at sn, at least one of
(faulty) replicas in sgi′′′ has to send a non-crash faulty message; otherwise, based on Algorithm 5
lines:{11-21}, any non-crash faulty message generated in i′′ will be ignored.
Finally, we prove fault detection property : strong completeness and strong accuracy. Roughly
speaking, (strong completeness) if a message is a non-crash faulty message, then the sender will be
detected eventually; otherwise, (strong accuracy) if a replica is correct, then it will never be detected.
Theorem 5. (strong completeness) If a replica sk fails arbitrarily outside anarchy, in a way that
would cause inconsistency in anarchy, then XPaxos FD detects sk as faulty (outside anarchy).
Proof :
1. By Lemma 14, it is equivalent to prove : in view change to i, if m is a non-crash faulty message
from replica sk, then correct active replica sj ∈ sgi detects the fault of sk.
2. By Definition 4 property (ii), every correct replica sk′ ∈ sgi′ has commit log of req at sn
generated in view equal to or higher than i′. Assume that the highest view in which commit log
of req is generated is i0 (i
′ ≤ i0 < i) .
Proof : By Lemma 7.
If in 2 i0 = i
′ :
3. Correct active replica sj ∈ sgi should receive m′ which contains commit log of req generated in
view i′ from correct active replica sk′ ∈ sgi′ .
Proof : By outside anarchy, 2, Definition 4 and Lemma 7.
4. If m satisfies Definition 4 property (iii).(1), then sj detects the fault of sk.
Proof : By Definition 4 property (iii).(1), prepare log of req is not included in m; then by 3
and Algorithm 6 lines:{3}, the fault is detected.
5. If m satisfies Definition 4 property (iii).(2), then sj detects the fault of sk.
Proof : By Definition 4 property (iii).(2), the prepare log at sequence number sn is generated
in view i′′ < i, then by 3 and Algorithm 6 lines:{6} the fault of sk is detected.
6. If m satisfies Definition 4 property (iii).(3), then sj detects the fault of sk.
Proof : If in Definition 4 property (iii).(3) i′′ = i′, then by 3 and Algorithm 6 lines:{6} the
fault of sk is detected; otherwise, if i
′′ > i′, then based on Lemma 7 req must be retrieved by
every correct active replica in view i′′; hence by outside anarchy and Algorithm 6 lines:{9-14}
the fault of sk is detected.
If in 2 i0 > i
′:
7. Every replica (correct or faulty) in view i0 has retrieved and prepared req in view equal to or
higher than i0.
Proof : By 2, i′′′ > i′ and Algorithm 3 lines:{26,28}.
8. In order to modify request committed at sn (i.e., req), at least one of (faulty) replicas, say sk′′′
(in sgi0 or not), has to send an inconsistent prepare log generated in view i1 ≥ i0. Hence, sk in
this case is harmless.
Proof : By 7, n = 2t + 1, i0 > i
′ and Algorithm 5 lines:{19}.
9. Correct active replica sj ∈ sgi should receive m′ which contains commit log of req generated in
view i2 (i
′ ≤ i2 ≤ i0 ≤ i1 < i) from correct active replica sk′ ∈ sgi′ .
Proof : By outside anarchy, 2, Definition 4 and Lemma 7.
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10. If i2 < i1, then the fault of sk′′′ is detected by Algorithm 6 lines:{9-16}, which is similar to
discussion in 6; if i2 = i1, then the fault of sk′′′ is detected by Algorithm 6 lines:{3,6}, which is
similar to discussion in 4 or 5.
11. Q.E.D.
Proof : By 3, 4, 5 and 6 and 10.
Theorem 6. (Strong accuracy) If a replica sk is benign (i.e., behaves faithfully), then XPaxos FD
will never detect sk as faulty.
Proof :
1. It is equivalent to prove : in view change to i, if sk is benign and sk sends a view-change
message m to all active replicas in view i, then no active replica in sgi can detect sk as faulty.
Proof : Equivalent.
∀ request req, view i′ < i and replica sj′ s.t. sk, sj′ ∈ sgi′ and committed(req, i′, sn, sj′):
2. m contains prepare log of req′ at sn generated in view i′′ ≥ i′.
Proof : By common case protocol Algorithm 1 lines:{9,17}, Algorithm 2 lines:{9,15} and view-
change Algorithm 5 lines:{1}, sk sends a prepare log at sequence number sn once sk prepared
a request at sn; by Algorithm 3 lines:{6-7}, correct replicas process messages in ascending view
order, hence i′′ ≥ i′.
3. sk will not be detected by Algorithm 6 lines:{3} due to committed(req, i′, sn, sj′).
Proof : By 2 and Algorithm 6 lines:{3}.
4. No other request req′′ 6= req′ is committed by any replica at sequence number sn in view i′.
Proof : By sk is correct and Lemma 6.
5. sk will not be detected by Algorithm 6 lines:{6} due to committed(req, i′, sn, sj′).
Proof : By 4 and Algorithm 6 lines:{6}.
6. sk will not be detected by Algorithm 6 lines:{9} due to committed(req, i′, sn, sj′).
Proof : By sk is correct, sk did not generate or accept any incorrect prepare log during view-
change to view i′′; by Algorithm 6 lines:{9}, Algorithm 5 lines:{3-7} and Lemma 7, no conflict
vcSeti
′′
k′ and finalProofsk′ [i
′′] exists in view i′′ at any active replica.
7. Q.E.D.
Proof : By 3, 5 and 6.
We can easily prove that if a fault is detected by any correct replica, then the fault is detected by
every replica eventually.
Lemma 15. In view change to i, if a correct active replica sj ∈ sgi detects the fault of sk, then
eventually every correct replica detects the fault of sk.
Proof : By Algorithm 6 lines:{6-7}.
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Appendix D Reliability analysis (examples)
In Table 5 and 6 we show the nines of consistency of each model when t = 1 and t = 2 for some
practical values of 9benign, 9synchrony and 9correct; in Table 7 and 8 we show the nines of availability of
each model when t = 1 and t = 2 for some practical values of 9available and 9benign.
9ofC(XPaxost=1)
9benign 9ofC(CFTt=1) 9correct
9synchrony 9ofC(BFTt=1)2 3 4 5 6
3 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 5
4 3
2 4 5 5 5 5
7
3 5 5 6 6 6
5 4
2 5 6 6 6 6
93 6 6 7 7 7
4 6 7 7 8 8
6 5
2 6 7 7 7 7
11
3 7 7 8 8 8
4 7 8 8 9 9
5 7 8 9 9 10
7 6
2 7 8 8 8 8
13
3 8 8 9 9 9
4 8 9 9 10 10
5 8 9 10 10 11
6 8 9 10 11 11
8 7
2 8 9 9 9 9
15
3 9 9 10 10 10
4 9 10 10 11 11
5 9 10 11 11 12
6 9 10 11 12 12
7 9 10 11 12 13
Table 5: 9ofC(CFTt=1), 9ofC(XPaxost=1) and 9ofC(BFTt=1) values when 3 ≤ 9benign ≤ 8, 2 ≤
9synchrony ≤ 6 and 2 ≤ 9correct < 9benign.
9ofC(XPaxost=2)
9benign 9ofC(CFTt=2) 9correct
9synchrony 9ofC(BFTt=2)2 3 4 5 6
3 2 2 4 5 5 5 5 7
4 3
2 5 6 6 6 6
10
3 6 7 8 8 8
5 4
2 6 7 7 7 7
133 7 8 9 9 9
4 7 9 10 11 11
6 5
2 7 8 8 8 8
16
3 8 9 10 10 10
4 8 10 11 12 12
5 8 10 12 13 14
7
6
2 8 9 9 9 9
19
3 9 19 11 11 11
4 9 11 12 13 13
5 9 11 13 14 15
6 9 11 13 15 16
8 7
2 9 10 10 10 10
22
3 10 11 12 12 12
4 10 12 13 14 14
5 10 12 13 15 16
6 10 12 14 16 17
7 10 12 14 16 18
Table 6: 9ofC(CFTt=2), 9ofC(XPaxost=2) and 9ofC(BFTt=2) values when 3 ≤ 9benign ≤ 8, 2 ≤
9synchrony ≤ 6 and 2 ≤ 9correct < 9benign.
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9ofA(CFTt=1)
9available
9benign 9ofA(BFTt=1) 9ofA(XPaxost=1)3 4 5 6 7 8
2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
3 3 4 5 5 5 5 5
4 4 5 6 7 7 7
5 5 6 7 9 9
6 6 7 11 11
Table 7: 9ofA(CFTt=1), 9ofA(BFTt=1) and 9ofA(XPaxost=1) values when 2 ≤ 9available ≤ 6 and
9available < 9benign ≤ 8.
9ofA(CFTt=2)
9available
9benign 9ofA(BFTt=2) 9ofA(XPaxost=2)3 4 5 6 7 8
2 2 3 4 4 4 5 4 5
3 3 4 5 6 7 7 8
4 4 5 6 7 10 11
5 5 6 7 13 14
6 6 7 16 17
Table 8: 9ofA(CFTt=2), 9ofA(BFTt=2) and 9ofA(XPaxost=2) values when 2 ≤ 9available ≤ 6 and
9available < 9benign ≤ 8.
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